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NEW TECHNOLOGY, OLD DEFENSES: INTERNET
STING OPERATIONS AND ATTEMPT LIABILITY
Audrey Rogers *
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet sting operations to catch adults preying on children
have grown as exponentially as the public's use of the Internet.
These operations typically involve an adult law enforcement offi-
cer posing as a child for Internet contact with a would-be defen-
dant.1 Defendants caught in a sting are charged with attempt be-
cause by use of the sting operation, law enforcement has
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1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") started the Innocent Images National
Initiative in 1995 to stop child sex exploitation through the Internet. Operating in FBI of-
fices throughout the country, the probes have resulted in the conviction of over 3,000 indi-
viduals. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Operation Candyman (Mar. 18,
2002) available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel2/cmO3l8O2.htm (last visited Nov.
22, 2003). A number of states have also commenced Internet sting operations. For exam-
ple, in New York, the Westchester County District Attorney's High Technology Crimes
Bureau currently operates a pedophile Internet sting operation. D.T. Max, Mouse
Trapped, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 25, 2002, at 2-3. This operation, which began in July 1999, uses
investigators from the District Attorney's office who log on to the Internet and pose as mi-
nors. See id. at 26. The investigators log on to online chat rooms and wait for contact from
possible pedophiles. Id. When a suspect does make contact, the investigator will then at-
tempt to remove any possible defenses that the suspect might raise at trial, such as not
having the requisite knowledge that the person he was communicating with was a minor;
claiming that it was merely an Internet fantasy, and finally asserting that it was not he,
the suspect, who the investigator was communicating with. Id. at 26, 78. See infra notes
149-51 and accompanying text. Once the suspect has attempted to set up a meeting with
the "minor," the investigators then obtain a subpoena for the suspect's Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") to obtain the subscriber's identification information. J. M. Hirsch, Cyber-
Cop Searches for Pedophiles, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at A20. A meeting is then set
up with the suspect and when he arrives at the meeting place, he is arrested. See J. Allan
Cobb, Evidentiary Issues Concerning Online 'Sting" Operations: A Hypothetical-Based
Analysis Regarding Authentication, Identification, and Admissibility of Online Conversa-
tions-A Novel Test for the Application of Old Rules to New Crimes, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 785
(2001); Michael W. Sheetz, Comment, CyberPredators: Police Internet Investigations Under
Florida Statute 847.0135, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 405 (2000).
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prevented the commission of the underlying offense against a
child.2 These cases provide a contemporary opportunity to revisit
some classic attempt liability issues. Some defendants have re-
vived use of a defense of impossibility as they claim that it is le-
gally impossible for them to be guilty of attempt to commit a
crime against a child since no child was involved.' Other defen-
dants assert that they were indifferent to the age of the victim
and therefore cannot be said to have the intent necessary for at-
tempt liability. Still other defendants claim they never believed
they were dealing with a minor. These latter defenses raise the
issue of the appropriate mens rea for attempt liability. Whether
intent is essential for all the crime's elements or whether some
mens rea less than intent is acceptable for a crime's attendant
circumstances, such as the age or existence of the victim, are is-
sues that had been relegated to narrow, abstract scholarly atten-
tion. 4 With the advent of Internet sting operations, a fresh ex-
amination of the issues is warranted.
Part II of this article addresses the general principles of at-
tempt liability, including a description of the doctrines of factual
and legal impossibility and the rationale behind the historical
treatment of these defenses. Part III describes recent Internet at-
tempt cases, and Part IV analyzes issues raised by such cases.
This article suggests that the new Internet cases provide further
rationale for rejecting a distinction between factual and legal im-
possibility that would allow the latter to be a defense. This article
also discusses issues surrounding the appropriate mens rea for
attempt, and its applicability to Internet cases, where the defen-
dants claim ignorance or indifference as to the age of the target of
his advances. It suggests that attempt liability is appropriate
only where there is proof the defendant believed that he was deal-
ing with a child.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1223 (11th Cir. 2002) (charging de-
fendant with attempting to persuade and entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual ac-
tivity); United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (charging defendant with
attempted exploitation of a minor); Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 458
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (charging defendant with transmitting harmful matter over the
Internet to a child in an attempt to seduce the child).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 99-131.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 211-17.
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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ATTEMPT LIABILITY
A. The Rationale of Attempt Liability
The crime of attempt exists to punish those who have tried, but
failed, to commit a substantive offense.5 "[The main rationale be-
hind the [crime of attempt]" is preventative: to stop individuals
who are bent on committing a crime by allowing early police in-
tervention.6 Attempt provides a basis of punishment for actors
who, by mere fortuity, have not completed a crime, but who are
indistinguishable in blameworthiness from those who succeed.7
Yet, failure, which is intrinsic to attempt liability, creates the oft-
noted apprehension of improper punishment.' Without the harm-
5. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 (1978);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (3d ed. 2000).
6. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(b), at 538. Other means are available to allow early
police intervention. See also State v. Young, 271 A.2d 569, 576-81 (N.J. 1970) (upholding a
law prohibiting entry into a school building "with the intent of disrupting classes or of oth-
erwise interfering with the peace and good order of the place"); LAFAVE, supra note 5, §
6.2(a), at 537-38. For example, possessory crimes, such as unlawful possession of burglary
tools, can allow early intervention. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35 (Consol. 2000).
Similarly, other anticipatory offenses, such as stalking offenses, achieve the same goal.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003). These other means of early
intervention are outside the scope of this article.
7. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5, introductory cmt. (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985); see also LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(b), at 539. LaFave points out that in cer-
tain situations, the person who fails to complete the substantive crime "may present a
greater continuing danger" to the public than the person who is successful and therefore
must be held liable. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(b), at 539. Notwithstanding the rationale
behind punishing attempts, typically, jurisdictions hold that blameworthiness differs be-
tween a crime of attempt and a completed crime, and therefore a lower penalty is affixed
for an attempt crime than for that of a completed crime. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05
(Consol. 1998) (utilizing punishment classification offenses-the sentence for the crime of
attempt is one classification below that of the completed crime); CAL. PENAL CODE § 664
(West 1999) (stating that the crime of attempt is punished by a sentence of one-half of the
maximum sentence authorized for the completed crime). The Model Penal Code departs
from this view and provides that the penalty for the crime of attempt may be the same as
that of the completed crime. Exceptions are made for capital and first degree felony
crimes. In those cases, they are graded as a felony in the second degree. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.05 cmt. 2.
8. Some commentators fear that to allow the government to punish for failures might
lead to overreaching on the part of the government. Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justifi-
cation: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266
(1976). Professor Robinson notes that "[i]f the criminal law is extended to punish bad in-
tent alone or the mere possibility of harmful conduct, it goes beyond its accepted role, ap-
pears unfair and overreaching, and ultimately loses its credibility and integrity." Id. at
266.
Similarly, George Fletcher points out that nearly every legal system in the Western
2004l
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ful result proscribed by the offense-in-chief, less certainty exists
as to an individual's blameworthiness.9
The reluctance to punish where no outward harm exists helps
to explain the relatively late common law development of the doc-
trine of criminal attempt.' ° Thus, commentators have noted that
the earliest English law "started from the principle that an at-
tempt to do harm is no offence."" It was not until the late eight-
world punishes more severely for a successful crime. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF
SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRLAL 82-83 (1988). He goes on to assert
that "[tlhe law can and should go only so far to implement a rule of reason abstracted from
the sensibilities of common people." Id. at 83. See generally Andrew Ashworth, Taking the
Consequences, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 106, 117-20 (Stephen Shute et al.
eds., 1993); Bj6rn Burkhardt, Is There a Rational Justification for Punishing an Accom-
plished Crime More Severely Than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 BYU L. REV. 553; Michael
Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAW & PHIL. 1
(1986); R.A. Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of Attempts, 9 LAw & PHIL. 1
(1990); FLETCHER, supra, at 63-83; FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 6.6.5, at 472-83; Michael S.
Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
237 (1994); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEO. L.J. 137 (1987).
9. See Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) (stating that attempt
rules must allow for a "locus poenitentiae"). See generally R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
37-38 (1996).
10. Early Roman law frequently punished criminal attempts. Jerome Hall, Criminal
Attempt-A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE L.J. 789, 790-91 (1940).
Romans distinguished ordinary crimes from atrocious crimes, punishing attempts to com-
mit the former only occasionally and by smaller penalties. Id. Punishment for atrocious
crimes was dependent upon the actor's intent as manifested by behavior, but the penalty
was typically based upon the gravity of the acts done. Id. In the sixteenth century, crimi-
nal attempt was included in recognized Roman codes, including the Carolina (1532) and
the Ordonnance de Blois (1579). Id. at 791; see also Eugene Rankin Meehan, The Trying
Problem of Criminal Attempt-Historical Perspectives, 14 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 137
(1979).
A handful of felony cases in which English courts imposed liability for conduct that fell
short of a completed crime existed in medieval times. Francis Bowes Sayre, Comment,
Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 826 (1928). In these cases, the courts applied
the theory of voluntas reputabatur pro facto (the intention is taken for the deed) to ration-
alize the punishment of uncompleted crimes. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(a), at 536. How-
ever, even in those times, mere intention alone was insufficient to subject a defendant to
criminal liability. Id. To be culpable, "the defendant must have manifested his intent 'by
some open deed tending to the execution of his intent.'" Id. (quoting EDWARDO COKE, THE
THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON,
AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 5 (1644)). Thus, early English law
insisted upon an overt action as an essential condition of criminal liability. See id.
11. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 560 n.10 (2d ed. 1960)
(quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 508 n.4 (2d ed. 1923) (1895)). The modern
doctrine of criminal attempt is generally thought to trace back to the Court of the Star
Chamber. Sayre, supra note 10, at 828 (citing 2 JAMES FITzJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 223-24 (London, MacMillan 1883)). The Court of the Star
Chamber was created "to correct the manifest defects and shortcomings of the common
law courts." Id. The Star Chamber dealt with many offenses that were the equivalent of
[Vol. 38:477
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eenth century that the common law developed a substantive
crime of attempt law.'2 Even so, tension exists between the need
for early intervention and the fear of punishing innocent actors.
13
present-day criminal attempt. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(a), at 536. For example, there
were numerous convictions for "lying in wait" with the intent to beat or murder, as well as
the use of threats or words "tending to a challenge." Hall, supra note 10, at 799. There
were also convictions of dangerous behavior that fell short of assault, such as where the
defendant "set his hand upon his dagger" or "struck at [the complainant] with his sword
but missed him narowlie [sic]." Id. at 799-800. While the Chamber occasionally used the
words "attempt" or "endeavor" in loosely describing such situations, it never formulated a
general theory or doctrine of criminal attempt. Id. at 803-04.
12. Following the abolition of the Court of the Star Chamber in 1640, many years
lapsed before the substantive crime of attempt was actually formulated in the common
law. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(a), at 536. In several early common law cases dealing with
uncompleted offenses, the courts continued to reflect the early English law views or state-
ments of the Court of the Star Chamber. Id. The development of criminal attempt was
most likely delayed by the fact that other means existed for the courts to deal with
unsuccessful or uncompleted criminal schemes, such as the crime of aggravated assault.
Id.
The closest approximation to the modern doctrine of criminal attempt was first articu-
lated by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Scofield, decided in 1784. Sayre, supra note 10, at 834
(citing Rex. v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784)) In Scofield, the defendant was charged with plac-
ing a lighted candle amidst combustible materials in the house he was renting with the
intention of setting fire and burning the house. Id. The indictment contained no allega-
tions or proof that the house was burned. Id. The defendant argued that an attempt to
commit a misdemeanor was not itself a misdemeanor. Id. The court rejected this argument
and Lord Mansfield declared:
It makes a great difference, whether an act was done; as in this case putting
fire to a candle in the midst of combustible matter, (which was the only act
necessary to commit a misdemeanor) and where no act at all is done. The in-
tent may make an act, innocent in itself, criminal; nor is the completion of an
act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute criminality.
Id. at 835 (quoting Scofield, Cald. at 400). Lord Mansfield later stated:
In the degrees of guilt there is a great difference in the eye of the law, but not
in the description of the offence. So long as an act rests in bare intention, it is
not punishable by our laws: but immediately when an act is done, the law
judges, not only of the act done, but of the intent with which it is done; and, if
it is coupled with an unlawful and malicious intent, though the act itself
would otherwise have been innocent, the intent being criminal, the act be-
comes criminal and punishable.
EUGENE MEEHAN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT-A TREATISE 8 (1984) (quoting Cald. at
403).
Thus, Scofield expressly held that a completed crime is not a necessary element of
criminality, provided that the defendant possessed the intention to take otherwise inno-
cent action in furtherance of a criminal offense.
Seventeen years later, the modern doctrine of criminal attempt was fully articulated in
Rex v. Higgins. Sayre, supra note 10, at 835 (citing Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269, 275
(1801)). In Higgins, the defendant was charged with soliciting a servant to steal his mas-
ter's property, but the indictment contained no allegation that the servant stole the goods.
Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. at 275. The court, "relying heavily upon" Scofield, affirmed the
conviction and held "[a]ll offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as
tend to the prejudice of the community, are indictable." Id. The court continued, saying
2004]
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Two philosophical approaches exist to address these concerns.
The early development of the law of attempt reflects an "objectiv-
ist" view that concentrated on the actor's conduct or actus reus in
assessing culpability. 14 As Professor Fletcher explains, "the act
[must] conform to objective criteria defined in advance. The act
must evidence attributes subject to determination independently
of the actor's intent."'5 The objectivists reason that unless the
danger is manifest, i.e., apparent to an objective viewer, a danger
exists that an actor will be punished merely for bad thoughts, or
improperly punished without adequate proof of harm. Objectivists
repeatedly point to a fear that convictions will be based on im-
proper evidentiary and prosecutorial tactics unless objective proof
of harm exists. 6 For example, Professor Enker states that
"[miens rea ... is not subject to direct proof. . . . It is the subject
of inference and speculation." 7 He fears that guilt will be estab-
lished solely through suspect factors such as uncorroborated tes-
timony of informants and accomplices, confessions, and prior bad
acts. 8 He notes that an objectivist approach protects individuals
from government intrusion on their thoughts and beliefs, which is
all the more important with modern methods of intelligence gath-
ering such as eavesdropping and surveillance.' 9
that "[t]he offence does not rest in mere intention; for in soliciting [the servant] to commit
the felony, the defendant did an act towards carrying his intent into execution. It is an en-
deavour or attempt to commit a crime." Id. Hence, the Higgins court formulated the pre-
sent-day doctrine that the attempt to commit a crime is itself a criminal offense. See
Sayre, supra note 10, at 836.
The Scofield and Higgins cases firmly established the law of criminal attempt in the
common law. Id. Thereafter the doctrine that "all such acts or attempts as tend to the
prejudice of the community are indictable" became widely accepted and repeated by both
courts and commentators. Id.
13. This tension is ameliorated in part by the generally accepted mens rea require-
ment of intent as the basis of attempt liability. See generally infra notes 29-40 and accom-
panying text.
14. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.3; Ronald H. Jensen, Reflections on United States
v. Leona Helmsley: Should 'Impossibility' Be a Defense to Attempted Income Tax Evasion?,
12 VA. TAX REV. 335, 365-72 (1993); Paul Kichyon Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Crimi-
nal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1183-84, 1188 (1957) (noting that the earliest law
used a subjectivist approach, but quickly moved to an objectivist approach).
15. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.3.1, at 138 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the
Legal Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 687-88 (1969); Jensen, supra note 14, at 367-68.
17. Enker, supra note 16, at 688.
18. See id. at 690; Jensen, supra note 14, at 368-69.
19. Enker, supra note 16, at 703.
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The drafters of the Model Penal Code were proponents of a
modern, fundamental shift toward a subjectivist view of criminal-
ity.21 "Subjectivism" focuses on an actor's state of mind. The ra-
tionale behind utilizing a subjectivist approach in attempt liabil-
ity is that a defendant, who intends to commit a crime, is
dangerous and worthy of punishment. 2' A subjectivist approach to
attempt culpability looks to what a defendant's intentions were in
undertaking certain actions and his beliefs about the circum-
stances surrounding his intent. The drafters of the Model Penal
Code rebutted objectivist concerns that the subjective approach
tends to criminalize conduct that is objectively innocent without
adequate protection against improper prosecution. The drafters
noted that the fear is "more theoretical than practical" because a
person would rarely be prosecuted on the basis of admission
alone.2 2 The drafters also raised an opposite concern that assess-
ing culpability solely on the basis of manifest criminality would
"excuse persons whose contemporaneous statements plus their
behavior are strongly suggestive of criminal purpose, but whose
behavior alone arguably would not be strongly corroborative of
that purpose."
2
20. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.3.5, at 167-70.
21. See id. at 171-74.
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
23. Id. at 320. As many have noted, the objective and subjective approaches have their
limitations. The principle of legality is the outside boundary of attempt liability. Under
this principle, there can be no punishment without law. See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 3.1,
at 205 (stating that "'the principle of legality,' is often expressed by the Latin phrase nul-
lum crimin sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without law)"). Thus,
criminal attempt liability cannot attach unless the defendant's conduct objectively con-
forms to specific criteria determined in advance. The rationale behind the principle of le-
gality is to put a check on the state's police powers to arrest merely "undesirable" indi-
viduals. Enker, supra note 16, at 670; 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §
85(d), at 431-34 (1984). Professor Robinson illustrates this limitation by referring to the
classic example of Lady Eldon's Lace, where Lady Eldon intends to smuggle French lace
into England without paying the duty on it. Id. at 432. The English customs officer finds
the lace, but informs Lady Eldon that no tariff exists on French lace. Id. To punish Lady
Eldon for attempting to violate the tariff law would violate the principle of legality since
there is no law to be broken, and therefore no attempt. Id. See also FLETCHER, supra note
5, § 3.3.3, at 148-57 (analyzing attempt and impossibility in various cases). Enker, supra
note 16, at 670-73. Thus, it is the concept of legality that underlies the rationale of the
true legal impossibility cases. See infra notes 99-131 and accompanying text.
While the subjectivist approach appears to resolve the problems associated with the ob-
jectivist approach, it too has limitations. For example, under the subjectivist standard, an
actor who attempts to kill by black magic or voodoo should face criminal liability because
the standard requires that the facts must be taken as the actor perceives them to be. In
the case of black magic or voodoo, if the actor believes that his use of the black magic is
2004]
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B. The Mens Rea of Attempt Liability
1. Classification of Elements of Crimes
Essential to an understanding of the issues raised in assessing
attempt liability is the identification of an offense's elements. The
Model Penal Code's historic innovation of an "element analysis"
approach to criminal law requires a culpable mental state for
every material element of an offense.24 This approach replaced
the common law "offense analysis," which required simply "crimi-
nal intent" for culpability. This single state of mind requisite had
been widely criticized as inadequate and unclear.25 The Model
Penal Code states that the material "element[s] of an offense" in-
clude "(i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii)
likely to produce the desired result, then under the subjectivist approach he would be
criminally liable even though the harm could never be achieved. See FLETCHER, supra note
5, § 3.3.7, at 174-75. Most commentators agree that such a result is undesirable. See gen-
erally LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.3, at 559-60. The Model Penal Code does not bar attempt
culpability in such scenarios; instead it provides for judicial discretion to dismiss a prose-
cution or mitigate a sentence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. Criminal culpability is governed by four possible men-
tal states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See id. The Model Penal
Code defines each mental state in terms of whether it is applicable to a particular element
of an offense. For example, "purposely" is defined as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
exist.
Id. § 2.02(2)(a) (emphasis added).
25. See Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code's Culpability Provisions
on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of
Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 229, 230 (1997) (noting that the Model Penal Code's re-
definition of the required mental states of defendants "obliterated ill-defined, confusing
common law language and concepts and replaced them with four specifically defined hier-
archical levels of culpability in relation to the three objective element types used to define
crimes"); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liabil-
ity: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 688-90 (1983) (observing
that common law offense analysis continues to exist despite the confusion and ambiguity it
creates); Martin T. Lefevour, Note, Supreme Court Review: 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) Requires
Mens Rea as to the Physical Characteristics of the Weapon, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1136, 1151-52 (1995) (Lefevour criticizes the use of offense analysis for its impreciseness
and ambiguity. He points out that offense analysis requires a single mental state for the
whole offense and fails to take into consideration certain elements that may require differ-
ing levels of intent.)
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such a result of conduct as is" included in the offense's defini-
tion.26
Although the Model Penal Code does not define "attendant cir-
cumstances," a definition suggested by Professor Duff that ap-
pears to comport with the intent of the Model Penal Code is that
an attendant circumstance is one that "exist[s] independently of
the [actor's conduct]."27 For example, the crime of trespass, which
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(i)-(iii). The Model Penal Code awkwardly defines
"material element" in the negative by excluding elements unrelated to the "harm or
evil.., sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." Id. § 1.13(10)(i). Reading
subsections (9) and (10) together, the material elements of an offense are the conduct, at-
tendant circumstances, and result as described in the description of the offense.
"'[Clonduct' means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where
relevant, a series of acts and omissions." Id. § 1.13(5). The Model Penal Code does not de-
fine the other elements. Commentators have suggested that the code's failure to define
"attendant circumstances" and "result" is a major weakness in the Model Penal Code ap-
proach. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 25, at 706.
We must also differentiate conduct from result elements. This article proposes the fol-
lowing definition: A "result" is a harmful consequence beyond defendant's conduct-i.e., it
cannot be synonymous with the defendant's conduct. Thus "result-oriented" crimes are
those where there is some conduct, stated either explicitly or implicitly, and a consequence
of that conduct. For example, robbery is defined as the forcible taking of the property of
another. To do a proper element analysis, we must first break the statute down into its
elements. Here, the defendant's conduct is the "forcible taking." The attendant circum-
stance, which exists independent of the actor's conduct, is "property of another." There is
no result element. The effect of a successful robbery is that the victim has less property,
but robbery is not a "result-oriented" crime under the above definition. There is no conse-
quence separate and apart from the conduct, and thus, no "result" element to the offense.
Compare robbery to murder. A person is guilty of murder when he intentionally causes
the death of another human being. Here there is no explicitly stated conduct element-any
act or omission will suffice. The attendant circumstance element is "human being." The
result element is "causes the death." The death is a consequence of the actor's conduct.
Professors Robinson and Grall propose that a result be defined as a "circumstance
changed by the actor." Robinson & Grall, supra note 25, at 724 (emphasis removed). Yet,
this definition would improperly expand the category of result-oriented crimes. For exam-
ple, robbery would be a result-oriented offense because the circumstance of property was
changed by the actor. Courts often improperly use the term "result" in a general manner
to mean the consequences of an actor's conduct, rather than as intended by the Model Pe-
nal Code to mean a specific narrow category of crimes. See Holley, supra note 25, at 230-
31 n.3; Audrey Rogers, Attempting the Unintended: Analyzing the Scope of Criminal At-
tempt Laws, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1999, at 1.
27. R.A. Duff, The Circumstances of an Attempt, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100, 104 (1991)
(emphasis removed). Similarly, Professors Robinson and Grall propose that an attendant
circumstance be defined as those independent of the actor. See Robinson & Grall, supra
note 25, at 724. Many commentators have noted the difficulty in distinguishing among the
various elements, particularly between attendant circumstances and the conduct and re-
sult elements. Id. at 709-10; see also J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70
HARV. L. REv. 422, 423 (1957). Nevertheless, the Duff definition appears to work well in
most instances and, in particular, for this article where the element in question will be the
requirement of a "minor." This requirement is undisputedly an attendant circumstance.
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is typically defined as entering the property of another without
consent. In breaking the crime down to its elements, the "con-
duct" element is the entering. The attendant circumstances are
the "property of another" and "without consent" requirements.
This article focuses on a narrow group of offenses that prohibit
unlawful dealings with a "minor."2" The requisite of a minor in
the definition of an offense is an essential element of an offense,
one that we categorize as an "attendant circumstance."
2. Mens Rea Requisites
A foundation of attempt law is that the actor must have the
specific intent to commit an offense." Yet uncertainty exists as to
whether this intent requirement applies to all of the material
elements of an offense. Some commentators take the position that
intent is necessary for all of the material elements to be guilty of
attempt.30 One scholar suggests an approach for imposing at-
tempt liability that requires intent for whatever element is miss-
ing, which precludes the actor from completing the offense-in-
chief.3' For example, an actor who shoots at a person but misses
would be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to cause
death-the missing element.32
Other commentators would require intent as to conduct or re-
sult for attempt culpability, but would allow something less than
intent for attendant circumstances, typically a minimum of reck-
lessness. 33 For example, a person could be guilty of attempted
rape, if having been stopped before the act was completed, he in-
28. See infra text accompanying note 150 (discussing a case involving the elements of
unlawful conduct with a minor).
29. See generally Sayre, supra note 10; LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(c), at 540.
30. See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L.
REV. 319, 342-43 (1955).
31. See generally John E. Stannard, Making Up for the Missing Element-A Sideways
Look at Attempts, 7 LEGAL STUD. 194 (1987) (discussing the principle that one can be pun-
ished for attempt without committing a crime, which is the missing element).
32. The problem with the Stannard approach is that it would not allow for attempt
liability in many impossibility situations where the missing element is an attendant cir-
cumstance, but often the defendant does not have intent as to that circumstance. See infra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
33. See Smith, supra note 27, at 429-33; Donald Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence and
Attempts, CRIM. L. REV. 647, 648-49 (1968).
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tended to have sexual intercourse with a non-consenting woman
and was reckless as to whether the woman consented.
In a variation of the previous approach, the Model Penal Code
states that attempt liability is appropriate if the actor intends the
conduct or result prohibited by the offense-in-chief, and has the
same mens rea for attendant circumstances as is required by the
offense-in-chief. 4 The rationale for this rule is that the danger-
ousness of the actor is manifested by his intent to engage in some
particular conduct or to cause a particular result--elements un-
der his control. The actor need not intend the attendant circum-
stances, which exist independent of his control; it is sufficient to
permit the mens rea of the underlying offense to govern.35
One ramification of the Model Penal Code approach is that
there is no logical bar to imposing attempt culpability for crimes
where the attendant circumstances are defined as strict liability
elements.36 Take, for example, a jurisdiction that provides that a
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that one could attempt a crime with strict li-
ability attendant circumstances. In People v. Coleman, the offense requires that a person,
"'knowingly... [a]dvance[ ] or profit[ ] from prostitution of a person less than sixteen years
old."' 547 N.E.2d 69, 69 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.30(2) (Consol. 2000)).
In Coleman, the defendant approached a twenty-four-year-old undercover officer and en-
couraged her to engage in prostitution, believing she was a fifteen-year-old runaway. Id.
Convicted of attempted promoting of prostitution in the second degree, the defendant ar-
gued on appeal that since the age element in the prostitution statute was one of strict li-
ability, the crime could not be attempted. Id. at 71. In rejecting the defendant's contention,
the court reasoned that the essence of the prostitution offense was the promoting of prosti-
tution, which had an intent element-"knowingly." Id. It explained that the strict liability
component of the offense-the age of the victim--"attaches not to the proscribed result of
the criminal conduct, the promoting of prostitution, but to an aggravating circumstance."
Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has made a similar ruling. See State v. Robins, 646
N.W.2d 287 (Wis. 2002) (finding defendant guilty of attempted child enticement despite
the fact that the child is fictitious).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2.
36. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2(c) at 543-44 (noting that scholarly au-
thority is lacking on the issue, but that attempt liability should be allowed). Taking the
Model Penal Code approach a step further, some states allow attempt liability for offenses
which are deemed wholly strict liability offenses (as opposed to having strict liability at-
tendant circumstances). See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 648 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (N.Y. 1995). In
Saunders, the defendant was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a weapon. On
appeal, he argued that since the underlying offense was a strict liability offense, he could
not be guilty of an attempt. Id. The court rejected this argument, noting that although the
possession statute was a strict liability offense, the definition of possession requires a vol-
untary act which provides the necessary mental state for attempt liability. Id. at 1334.
Most jurisdictions, however, hold that a person cannot attempt a crime that prohibits a
wholly unintentional result. For example, attempted manslaughter is a logical impossibil-
ity in most jurisdictions because a defendant cannot attempt the unintended. See, e.g.,
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person is guilty of statutory rape if he engages in intercourse with
an underage partner, and that age is a strict liability element of
the offense.37 A person who is stopped before he has intercourse
with an underage partner would be guilty of attempted statutory
rape where he intends the intercourse, regardless of his mens rea
as to the age of his partner.8 Thus, even a reasonable mistake as
to the victim's age would be inadmissible as a defense.39
State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912, 914 (Haw. 1995) (holding that attempted involuntary man-
slaughter is statutorily impossible); Stennet v. State, 564 So. 2d 95, 97 (Ala. Crim. App.
1990) ("There is no such offense as attempted manslaughter in Alabama."); State v.
Barnes, 781 P.2d 69, 70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he offenses of attempted reckless man-
slaughter and attempted negligent homicide are not cognizable under Arizona laws be-
cause reckless and negligent states of mind are unintentional and attempt crimes require
intentional, purposive conduct."); People v. Brito, 283 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that there is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter because by
definition it does not require the defendant to have the specific intent to kill); Common-
wealth v. Hebert, 368 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Mass. 1977) ("[T]here is no such crime as at-
tempted involuntary manslaughter. An attempt to commit a crime necessarily involves an
intent to commit that crime. Involuntary manslaughter is homicide unintentionally
caused. Hence, an attempt to commit involuntary manslaughter is logically impossible.")
(citations omitted). But see Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 528 (Colo. 1998) (noting that
although it is contrary to most jurisdictions, Colorado law provides "[i]t is possible to be
convicted of attempt without the specific intent to obtain the forbidden result."); Gentry v.
State, 437 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1983) ("If the state is not required to show specific in-
tent to successfully prosecute the completed crime, it will not be required to show specific
intent to successfully prosecute an attempt to commit that crime."). See generally Rogers,
supra note 26, at 1 (analyzing New York decisions in which criteria is set forth for deter-
mining the feasibility of attempting multi-element offenses).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
the defendant's claim of reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim, holding that it was
the legislature's intent that statutory rape was a strict liability offense); State v. Granier,
765 So. 2d 998, 1000-01 (La. 2000) (noting that the legislature could and did validly dis-
pense with a scienter requirement as to the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, so the
provision that lack of knowledge of the victim's age was not a defense was not unconstitu-
tional); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 56 (Md. 1999) (holding that the defendant's due proc-
ess rights were not violated by the refusal to allow him the use of a reasonable mistake of
age defense, the court pointed out the legislature's refusal to allow the defense was sup-
ported by its compelling interest in protecting children from sexual abuse); State v. Yanez,
716 A.2d 759, 764 (R.I. 1998) (affirming the defendant's conviction of statutory rape stat-
ing, "the plain words and meaning of § 11-37-8.1 prohibit the sexual penetration of an un-
deraged person and make no reference to the actor's state of mind, knowledge, or belief. In
our opinion this lack of a mens rea results not from negligent omission but from legislative
design.").
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2. See, e.g., State v. Chhom, 911 P.2d 1014,
1016 (Wash. 1996) (holding that the intent requirement for attempted rape of a child is
the intent to accomplish the criminal result-sexual intercourse-and not the intent to
have sexual intercourse with a child); Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 544
(Mass. 1985). In Dunne the court affirmed the defendant's conviction of assault on a child
under the age of sixteen with the intent to commit rape, holding:
in a prosecution for an assault with intent to commit statutory rape...
whether or not the defendant is aware of the victim's age is irrelevant ....
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The Model Penal Code approach is particularly relevant to ana-
lyzing the issues surrounding attempt liability and Internet sting
operations. In many jurisdictions where law enforcement has
conducted Internet sting operations, the statutes under which de-
fendants have been charged provide that the attendant circum-
stance of "a minor" is a strict liability element.4 ° The effect of such
a designation on attempt liability is discussed below.
C. The Actus Reus of Attempts
A tenet of criminal law is that bad thoughts alone do not con-
stitute a crime.41 In order to be convicted of the crime of attempt,
the defendant must have engaged in some form of activity that
constitutes a measurable portion of the crime. While it has been
widely held that mere preparation alone is not enough to consti-
"[Tihe fact that the defendant was ignorant of the age of [the victim] or that
he did not intend the intercourse to be with a [person] of nonage would not
prevent his act from constituting rape if completed, or an attempt, if it failed."
Dunne, 474 N.E.2d at 544 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Davis, 229 A.2d 842, 844 (N.H. 1967)). Cf State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 571 (Kan. 2001) (Af-
firming the defendant's conviction of attempted indecent liberties with a child after being
caught in an Internet sting operation, the court rejected the defendant's claim that the age
of the child was immaterial to him and held "that proof of criminal intent where a defen-
dant is charged with a crime that includes age as an essential element does not even re-
quire proof that the accused had knowledge of the age of a minor.").
39. See supra notes 37-38.
40. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(3) (Consol. 1998) (stating that the age of a minor
is a strict liability element). Not all jurisdictions make the attendant circumstance of "a
minor" one of strict liability. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (Cal.
1964) (holding that reasonable mistake of age is a defense to a charge of statutory rape);
State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1984) (holding the same). Because of First
Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that a federal
statute dealing with receipt of child pornography bars strict liability for the element of "a
minor." See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 2252). Nevertheless, the Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2251, which prohibits the
production of child pornography, does not contain a scienter requirement as to the element
of a "minor." Id. at 76-77. Similarly, federal courts have ruled that federal statutes prohib-
iting sexual abuse of minors can have strict liability elements. See, e.g., United States v.
Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Muzii, 676 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The reach of
the criminal law has long been limited by the principle that no one is punishable for his
thoughts."); Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 773 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) ("Guilty intention,
unconnected with an overt act or outward manifestation, 'cannot be the subject of punish-
ment under statute.'") (quoting Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628, 629 (Mo. 1896)); see also
LAFAVE supra note 5, § 3.2, at 206 ("Bad thoughts alone cannot constitute a crime; there
must be an act."); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01[B], at 82 (3d
ed. 2001) ("[P]unishment for thoughts alone would be objectionable.").
20041
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tute attempt, there has been great debate over what acts do con-
stitute a measurable portion of a crime. 2 There are no clear-cut
lines of delineation between mere preparation and criminal at-
tempt.
Currently, jurisdictions utilize several differing approaches to
determine what acts are sufficient to result in a conviction of
criminal attempt. The two most prevalent approaches are the
proximity approach and the substantial step approach. The prox-
imity approach focuses not on what the defendant has actually
done, but what remains to be done. This test was originally for-
mulated by Justice Holmes, who set forth the theory that in order
for the defendant to be convicted of criminal attempt "[there
must be dangerous proximity to success."4 3 Factors to be consid-
ered are "the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty of the result,
and the seriousness of the apprehension, coupled with the great
harm likely to result.""
42. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 10, at 845 ("The line between preparation and attempt,
however, must at best depend largely upon the particular circumstances of each case-the
seriousness of the crime attempted, and the danger to be apprehended from the defen-
dant's conduct."); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) ("[P]reparation is
not an attempt. But some preparations may amount to an attempt. It is a question of de-
gree ... the degree of proximity held sufficient may vary with circumstances, including,
among other things, the apprehension which the particular crime is calculated to excite.");
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 584 (2d ed. 1960) (supporting the
distinction between preparation and attempt but conceding that the difference is a "differ-
ence in degree... [rather than] in kind").
Some commentators assert that it is desirable to have no clear cut delineation between
mere preparation and attempt:
The exact point at which [such preliminary steps] become criminal cannot, in
the nature of things, be precisely ascertained, nor is it desirable that such a
matter should be made the subject of great precision. There is more harm
than good in telling people precisely how far they may go without risking
punishment in the pursuit of an unlawful object.
P.R. Glazebrook, Should We Have a Law of Attempted Crime?, 85 L.Q. Rev. 28, 35 n.36
(1969) (quoting JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 83 (London, MacMillan 1890) (alteration in original)).
Adopting an opposite view, the American Law Institute, in an effort to add clarity and
definiteness to the preparation-attempt determination, has put forth "specific enumera-
tions" of circumstances in which the defendant's conduct will not be held insufficient as a
matter of law as long as the conduct is strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal
purpose. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985);
Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code,
and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735 (1988) (supporting the Model Penal
Code approach and noting the need for authoritative examples to aid in the determination
of what acts go beyond mere preparation).
43. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897).
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The Model Penal Code promulgated the "substantial step" ap-
proach, which requires "an act or omission constituting a sub-
stantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in [the
actor's] commission of the crime."45  This conduct must be
"strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."4' Ap-
proximately half the states and two-thirds of the federal circuits
have adopted the substantial step test.4 v Unlike the proximity
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c).
46. Id. § 5.01(2). The Model Penal Code sets forth several categories of conduct that
will not be held insufficient as a matter of law. Id. If such conduct is proved, it is entitled
to be submitted to the jury to determine whether the defendant progressed far enough to-
ward the commission of the crime. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.09(D)(1), at 409.
Such conduct includes:
lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the
crime... reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the
crime; [or] possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the
crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can serve no
lawful purpose of the actor.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(a),(c),(e). For example, in State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909
(Tenn. 1996), the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the defendants' conviction of at-
tempted murder in the second degree. Id. at 909. In Reeves, the defendants, two girls who
attended middle school, agreed to bring rat poison to school intending to poison their
teacher. Id. They were caught giggling and leaning over the teacher's coffee mug with the
poison packet in their pocketbook placed next to the mug. Id. The court, in applying the
substantial step test, upheld the defendants' convictions of attempt to commit murder in
the second degree. Id. at 914. The court determined that the defendants' actions could be
considered a "substantial step" because the girls possessed the materials to be used in the
commission of the intended crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and the poison in
their possession had no lawful purpose under the circumstances. Id. But see United States
v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting there was insufficient evidence of a sub-
stantial step to support an attempt conviction).
47. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(a) (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-201(a)(2)
(Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
49(a)(2) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531(2) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-1
(2003); HAw. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1)(b) (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4(a) (West
2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(a) (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.010(1)(b)
(Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.17(i) (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.011(i) (West 1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-201(1)(b) (1995 & Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1 (1996); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2c:5-1 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
161.405(1) (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 901(a) (West 1998); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
15.01 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(1) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.28.020(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (Michie 2003).
Although Maryland and Rhode Island have not codified the substantial step test, they
have adopted it through judicial action. See Young v. State, 493 A.2d 352, 359 (Md. 1985);
State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I. 1982).
All the circuits, except the Federal Circuit, which does not hear criminal appeals, have
adopted the substantial step test. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6993 (5th Cir. 2002), affd on reh'g, 313 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 1375 (2003); United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1149 (2002); United States v. Smith, 264 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2001); Sui
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test, the substantial step test focuses on how much has already
been done.' Because of the change in focus, the substantial step
test is more conducive to a finding of attempt liability than is the
proximity test.49
v. I.N.S., 250 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1069 (2002); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d
1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Burks, 135 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir.
1996); United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 855 (1996);
United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dworken, 855
F.2d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1988).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 6(a). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 41, §
27.09(D)(1), at 409; LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 550.
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 6(a); See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.31, at 138-39
(comparing the objectivist approach to the attempt theory with the subjectivist approach
and noting that while the objectivist approach "tend[s] to draw the line of liability" closer
to the completed crime, the subjectivist approach "push[es] back the threshold of attempt-
ing" to an earlier stage of activity); see also DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.09(D)(1), at 409
(noting that the substantial step standard 'broaden[s] the scope of attempt liability").
Keith Culver notes:
The Model Penal Code clearly intends the 'substantial step' test to supply a
means of marking at the earliest point evidence of formation of an intention
to commit a wrong action. Unlike a 'last act' test which looks for conduct to
have passed a point of no return, the 'substantial step' test requires only suf-
ficient conduct (as evidence) to warrant the inference to an intention to com-
mit a wrong action and in that way to endanger the public.
Keith Culver, Analyzing Criminal Attempts, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 441, 445 (1998) (book
review).
Less prevalent approaches used by some jurisdictions to determine the line between
preparation and attempts include the "probable desistance" test and the unequivocality
test. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5(a)-(f); DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.06 (A)-(B)
at 389-96. The probable desistance test will find an act constitutes attempt only where the
act, in the ordinary course of events, would result in the intended crime unless interrupted
by some intervening factors. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5(d); DRESSLER, supra note
41, § 27.06(B)(6) at 394; see also Boyles v. State, 175 N.W.2d 277, 278 (Wis. 1970). In
Boyles, the defendant attempted to rob a tavern owner but he was unsuccessful because
his gun became stuck in his pocket which allowed the victim time to escape. Id. The issue
before the court was whether the defendant would have committed the crime except for
the intervening fact that he could not remove the gun from his pocket. Id. The court, after
reviewing the evidence, including the testimony of several witnesses who saw part of the
gun in the defendant's pocket, held that "[t]he defendant did not abandon his efforts but
he was prevented from successfully carrying out the crime by circumstances beyond his
control." Id. at 279. This approach has been criticized because it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to predict when it would be improbable that the defendant desist. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5(d)-(f). The drafters of the Model Penal Code point out that there
is a sufficient empirical basis for determining such predictions and therefore, as applied,
this test does not differ from the proximity test. Id. § 5.01 cmt. 5(d).
The unequivocality test provides that an act constitutes attempt only if, when consid-
ered alone, it firmly shows the actor's intent to commit the intended crime. SIR JOHN SAL-
MOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 137, at 404 (7th ed. 1924). The test is also referred to as the "res
ipsa loquitur" test because the act constituting attempt must "speak[ ] for itself." Id.
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D. Entering the "Semantical Thicket" ° - Factual and Legal
Impossibility
1. Background
A multitude of reasons and circumstances can lead to the fail-
ure of a defendant to consummate a substantive crime. The im-
possibility doctrine in attempt law considers a distinct type of
failure-those that stem from some mistake on a defendant's part
as to a crime's attendant circumstances. 1 The historical reluc-
tance to punish defendants for unconsummated crimes noted
above also led to the initial development of the impossibility doc-
trine, which barred any culpability for physically impossible at-
tempts regardless of the type of mistake. 2 Thus in Regina v.
Collins,53 the court held that a defendant who picked an empty
pocket, a scenario that later became the classic example of factual
impossibility, was not guilty of attempted larceny. 4 According to
the Collins court, "We think that an attempt to commit a felony
can only be made out when, if no interruption had taken place,
the attempt could have been carried out successfully, and the fel-
ony completed of the attempt to commit which the party is
charged."55
Although the English courts ultimately abandoned such a
sweeping impossibility rule, the Collins court's reasoning lays a
critical foundation to the next step in the development of the im-
possibility doctrine-the distinction between factual and legal
In other words, the actor's statements regarding his intent before, during, or after the act
are not considered when deciding attempt culpability. Id.
Criticism of this approach is based on its impracticality. Glanville Williams, in Criminal
Law the General Part (2d ed. 1961), sets forth a hypothetical involving a man with a
match near a haystack which might constitute a unequivocal act if he were stopped by the
police at that point. Id. at 630. But, as Williams considers, what if the next step the actor
intended was to sit down and light a cigar? Considered alone, as the test requires, the
lighting of the match near the haystack would manifest criminality, but subsequent ac-
tions might render the act equivocal and as a result innocent people may be convicted us-
ing this approach. Id.
50. United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001).
51. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
52. Sayre, supra note 10, at 854.
53. 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (C.A. 1864).
54. Id. at 1478; Sayre, supra note 10, at 854-55.
55. Sayre, supra note 10, at 855.
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impossibility.56 The very existence of a distinction again reflects
judicial discomfort with punishing unconsummated crimes. Thus,
the earliest development of the types of impossibility started from
the Collins perspective, which measured culpability by looking at
the completed crime and whether completion was factually possi-
ble.1
7
2. Factual Impossibility
Factual impossibility exists when a defendant's efforts to com-
mit a crime fail because a factual or physical circumstance neces-
sary for the crime to be completed is missing." To use a classic
example, had the victim's pocket been full of money, the defen-
dant pickpocket would have successfully completed his attempt
and would have stolen the victim's money. In other words, to use
the Collins court's basic rationale, the attempt would have been
carried out successfully had the facts been as the defendant in-
tended. Therefore, the defendant will be guilty of attempt culpa-
bility under the virtually undisputed rule that factual impossibil-
ity is not a defense to a charge of criminal attempt.59
3. Legal Impossibility
Providing a definition of "legal impossibility" is difficult be-
cause the courts have used the term to cover more than one type
of attempt that is legally impossible to complete.6 ° Professor
Dressler notes two different types that fall under the general
56. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(B), at 397-98.
57. See Sayre, supra note 10, at 854-55. The English courts ultimately abandoned this
type of impossibility rule. Id. at 855.
58. DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(C)(1), at 398.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(a)-(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 632 (3d ed. 1982);
DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(C)(2), at 399; see also United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d
877, 885 (4th Cir. 1995) (joining other circuits in holding factual impossibility is not a de-
fense to an attempt crime); United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 941 ("[F] actual impossibility is not a defense if the crime could have
been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.");
Grill v. State, 651 A.2d 856, 858 (Md. 1995) ("IFlactual impossibility is not a defense to a
criminal attempt charge.").
60. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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term "legal impossibility."61 The first is "pure" or "true legal im-
possibility" which exists when what the defendant is attempting
to commit is actually not a crime." Notwithstanding a defen-
dant's subjective bad intentions, he is not guilty of any crime.
Pure legal impossibility is the mirror image of the ignorance of
the law doctrine: while ignorance of an existing law criminalizing
a defendant's conduct cannot exonerate a defendant, ignorance of
the lack of a law criminalizing a defendant's conduct cannot in-
culpate him.63 Pure legal impossibility is a defense in all jurisdic-
tions.64
Professor Dressler's second category of legal impossibility-the
more conventional category-is "hybrid legal impossibility, 65
which he defines as follows: "Hybrid legal impossibility.., exists
if the actor's goal is illegal, but commission of the offense is im-
possible due to a factual mistake ... regarding the legal status of
some attendant circumstance that constitutes an element of the
charged offense."
66
The controversial but classic finding of legal impossibility oc-
curred in People v. Jaffe,67 where a defendant believed he was re-
ceiving stolen goods, when in fact the goods had been returned to
their rightful owner and thus had lost their character as stolen, a
required legal element. The Court of Appeals of New York re-
versed the defendant's conviction of attempt to receive stolen
goods on the ground that the defendant could not complete the of-
fense because the legal element of stolen goods was missing, and
61. DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(D)(1), at 400.
62. For example, A engages in private homosexual activity under the mistaken belief
that to do so would constitute a criminal offense in that particular jurisdiction. Although A
believes he is violating the law, he cannot be held criminally liable because it is not a
criminal offense to engage in private homosexual activity in that jurisdiction. Another ex-
ample would be where B lies to a police officer under the mistaken belief that in doing so
he is committing perjury. If lying to a police officer does not constitute perjury in that ju-
risdiction, it would be legally impossible for B to be criminally liable for attempted per-
jury. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.34, at 164. See generally Enker, supra note 16; Tho-
mas Weigend, Why Lady Eldon Should Be Acquitted: The Social Harm in Attempting the
Impossible, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 235-36 & nn.24-26 (1977).
63. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(D)(2), at 400. See generally Kenneth W.
Simons, Criminal Law: Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A
Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990) (examining the mistake and
impossibility defense).
64. DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07(D)(2), at 400-01.
65. Id. § 27.07(D)(3), at 402-04.
66. Id. § 27.07(D)(3), at 402.
67. 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906).
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therefore he also could not be convicted of attempt to commit the
crime." The Jaffe court reasoned that, "[i]f all which an accused
person intends to do would, if done, constitute no crime, it cannot
be a crime to attempt to do with the same purpose a part of the
thing intended."6 9
The term "legal impossibility" also covers a third category: the
situation where it is logically impossible to commit an attempt.
For example, courts have held that it is impossible to commit at-
tempted reckless manslaughter because one cannot intend to
cause an unintended result.70 According to the courts, it is a con-
tradiction in terms to attempt to cause an unplanned death.
The relatively late development of the doctrine of attempt li-
ability correlates to the development of the legal impossibility de-
fense. The objectivist fear of punishment without overt evidence
of intent to harm can be seen as the common factor between at-
tempt rules in general and legal impossibility in particular.7
68. Id. at 170.
69. Id. (citing JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 747 (7th ed. 1882)). California
took an opposite approach to impossibility. In People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal.
1961), the Supreme Court of California was presented with facts identical to Jaffe and up-
held the defendant's conviction of attempting to receive stolen property. Instead of focus-
ing on what the defendant did or could not do as the court in Jaffe did, the Supreme Court
of California in Rojas focused on what the defendant intended to accomplish. Id. The court
rejected the defendant's argument of impossibility holding that impossibility is not a de-
fense where "the defendants had the specific intent to commit the substantive offense and
that under the circumstances as the defendants reasonably saw them they did the acts
necessary to consummate the substantive offense; but because of circumstances unknown
to defendants, essential elements of the substantive crime were lacking." Id. Reaffirming
Rojas' viability, the Court of Appeal of California more recently decided People v. Reed, 61
Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). There, the court upheld the defendant's conviction
of attempted molestation of a child under the age of fourteen years. Id. at 660. The defen-
dant placed an ad in a paper and a sheriffs detective responded. Id. at 659. The defendant
argued that he could not be convicted because there was never a child under the age of
fourteen and therefore it was improper to convict him of attempt where an element of the
crime was missing. Id. at 660. The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding, "[olur
courts have repeatedly ruled that persons who are charged with attempting to commit a
crime cannot escape liability because the criminal act they attempted was not completed
due to an impossibility which they did not foresee." Id. at 661.
70. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1939). In Taylor, the court
found that there was no liability for attempting to bribe a juror where the person was not
in fact a juror. Id. The court noted that "[i]f the thing defendant attempted to do would
not and could not, under the statute, have been a crime if accomplished, how can it be said
that he attempted to commit the denounced crime, however reprehensible may have been
his intent from the standpoint of morals?" Id. In State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1953), the court found that there was no liability for attempt to shoot a deer out
of season where the "deer" is a stuffed decoy. Id. The court held, "[i]t is no offense to at-
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Thus, an early commentator opined, in reasoning that echoed the
Jaffe court, "[i]f none of the consequences which the defendant
sought to achieve constitutes a crime, surely his unsuccessful ef-
forts to achieve his object cannot constitute a criminal attempt., 72
Some commentators fear convictions based on suspect evi-
dence, such as coerced confessions or uncorroborated testimony
by informants. 73 Accordingly, these commentators support the le-
gal impossibility doctrine by ignoring any evidence of the defen-
dant's intent, focusing instead solely on what the defendant, in
fact, did. For example, one scholar explained that, "[ilf a man,
mistaking a dummy in female dress for a woman, tries to ravish
it he does not have the intent to commit rape since the ravish-
ment of an inanimate object cannot be rape. 74 Similarly, another
commentator would acquit a defendant who, intending to kill a
man, shoots at a tree stump instead on the grounds that there is
no objective, independent evidence of the defendant's intent that
can be inferred from the innocuous act of shooting at a tree
stump. 75 These rationales led to numerous examples of attempts
barred by the legal impossibility defense.76
tempt to do that which is not illegal. Id. Neither is it a crime to attempt to do that which it
is legally impossible to do." Id. (citations omitted). In People v. Teal, 89 N.E. 1086, 1088
(N.Y. 1909), the court found that there was no liability for attempted subornation of per-
jury where the false testimony solicited was immaterial and therefore not perjurious,
"stating that an unsuccessful attempt to do that which is not a crime, when effectuated,
cannot be held to be an attempt to commit the crime specified." Id. In Booth v. State, 398
P.2d 863, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964), the court found that there was no liability for at-
tempt to receive stolen property where the stolen goods were returned to the control of
their true owner. Id. The court held, "lilt is fundamental to our law that a man is not pun-
ished merely because he has a criminal mind. It must be shown that he has, with that
criminal mind, done an act which is forbidden by the criminal law." Id.
72. Sayre, supra note 10, at 839. The Jaffe court stated substantially the same ration-
ale. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Enker, supra note 16. But see Weigend, supra note 62.
74. Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 467
(1954).
75. Perkins, supra note 30, at 332-33.
76. See cases cited supra note 71. In discussions of legal impossibility, these cases are
repeatedly cited as examples. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 669 P.2d 1086 (N.M. 1983); People
v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1977); see also DRESSLER supra note 41, § 27.07, at 402;
LAFAVE supra note 5, § 6.3(a), at 552-60; R.J. Spjut, When is an Attempt to Commit an
Impossible Crime a Criminal Act?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 247 (1987); Elizabeth Jean Watters,
Comment, State v. Collins: Is the Impossible Now Possible in Ohio?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 307
(1990); Deborah M. Weiss, Note, Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility: The Philosophy of
Language and Problems ofMens Rea, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1983).
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Over time the doctrine of hybrid legal impossibility has been
widely criticized. 77 Most of the criticism is based on the slim se-
mantic difference between factual and legal impossibility.7" As
aptly pointed out by Professor Dressler and others, "by skillful
characterization, one can describe virtually any case of hybrid le-
gal impossibility ... as an example of factual impossibility."79
For example, one could turn the pickpocket attempted larceny
scenario into a case of legal impossibility if one asks whether it is
a crime to pick an empty pocket. Since a larceny cannot be com-
mitted by picking an empty pocket, employing the rationale of the
legal impossibility cases, one cannot attempt a larceny by picking
the empty pocket. Similarly, we can turn the legal impossibility
case into one of factual impossibility simply by asking whether
77. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(a)-(c), at 307-17 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); see, e.g., United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001)
("[Tihis circuit has properly eschewed the semantical thicket of the impossibility defense
in criminal attempt cases."); United States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1976)
(refusing to address the impossibility issue and asserting that it "lurks in a semantic
swamp"); People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Cal. 1961) (rejecting the defense and re-
fusing to consider the distinction between factual and legal impossibility); State v. Moretti,
244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J. 1968) ("[T]he defense of impossibility is so fraught with intricacies
and artificial distinctions that the defense has little value as an analytical method for
reaching substantial justice."); Jerome B. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A
Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20, 33-36 (1968); Hall, supra note 10, at 831-39 (re-
ferring to the doctrine as completely untenable and fallacious because it assumes that "be-
cause the intended harm could not be accomplished, none occurred"); John F. Preis, Note,
Witch Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1898 (1999) (noting hybrid legal impossibility's implicit similarity to
factual impossibility and pointing out that miscalculations involved in hybrid impossibility
cases are "at heart, still factual"). See generally Simons, supra note 63; Weigend, supra
note 62; DRESSLER, supra note 41. Even New York rejected the Jaffe rule by statute. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (Consol. 1998).
78. Part of this problem stems from the lack of parallelism in the definition of factual
and legal impossibility. For example, let us examine a common explanation of the two.
(1) Where the act if completed would not be criminal, a situation which is
usually described as a "legal impossibility", [sic] and (2) where the basic or
substantive crime is impossible of completion, simply because of some physi-
cal or factual condition unknown to the defendant, a situation which is usu-
ally described as a "factual impossibility". [sic]
Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964).
The definitions are not parallel because the former concentrates on whether the conduct,
had it been completed, would be a crime, while the latter concentrates on the reasons why
the conduct was not completed. These definitions widely used by early courts, are com-
pletely unworkable for situations of hybrid legal impossibility because it does not focus on
the key component of attempt liability-the defendant's intent. Rather, the definitions
look to whether the completed transaction objectively is a crime, and thus merely define
the "pure" legal impossibility category.
79. DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 27.07, at 403.
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the crime of receipt of stolen goods would have been committed
had the facts been as defendant intended.0
The drafters of the Model Penal Code took the position that the
distinction between factual and legal impossibility should be abol-
ished for a number of reasons.8 ' First, the legal impossibility doc-
trine focuses unnaturally on what actually transpired rather than
what defendant believed, leading to strained reasoning at odds
with conventional understanding of terms such as intent and
purpose. 2 Second, the Model Penal Code drafters opined that the
proper approach to criminality should focus on the dangerousness
of the actor as manifested by his intent, rather than his actions.8 3
Thus, the Model Penal Code recommended a rejection of an objec-
tivist approach in favor of a subjectivist viewpoint.'
Most jurisdictions, in keeping with the Model Penal Code rec-
ommendation have either explicitly abolished the distinction be-
tween factual and legal impossibility, by statute or case law, or
simply avoid the distinction altogether. 5 Other jurisdictions take
80. See generally Simons, supra note 63, at 472-74.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3.
82. Id. § 5.01 cmt. 3(a).
83. Id. § 5.01 cmt. 3(b).
84. Id. § 5.01 cmt. 3(a), 3(c).
85. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-202(b)(2) (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-
101(1) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-4 (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4(b) (West
2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(b) (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301 (2001); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27(A) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17 subd. 2 (West 2003);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (Consol. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (Anderson
2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.425 (2001); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 901(b) (West 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(3)(b) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020 (West 2003);
United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e eschew any effort to
distinguish so-called legal impossibility from factual impossibility.. . ."); United States v.
Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[N]o consensus can be ascertained from the
limited number of federal cases discussing the problem .... We decline to grasp the net-
tle."); United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 883-86 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the impossi-
bility defense and requiring instead reliance on the defendant's unique overt acts); United
States v. Duran, 884 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.5, 580-82 (D.D.C. 1995) ("In any event, categoriz-
ing a case as involving legal versus factual impossibility is difficult, if not pointless."),
affd, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996); State v. Carner, 541 P.2d 947, 948-50 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1975) (rejecting the defense of legal impossibility and agreeing with "the California ap-
proach" of not being concerned with the distinction between legal and factual impossibil-
ity); State v. Curtiss, 65 P.3d 207, 211 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting impossibility de-
fense and holding that Idaho section 18-306 eliminates the defense); Van Bell v. State, 775
P.2d 1273, 1274 (Nev. 1989) (declining to distinguish between factual and legal impossibil-
ity focusing on the specific intent to commit the offense); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 502
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (finding that legislature intended to preclude impossibil-
ity defense in revising state statute based on Model Penal Code); State v. Hageman, 296
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a "middle ground" approach, measuring attempt liability by
requiring proof that "first, that the defendant acted with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the
underlying substantive offense, and, second, that the defendant
had engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of the crime." " With respect to the second
requirement, these jurisdictions require further that "the
objective acts performed, without any reliance on the
accompanying mens rea, [must] mark the defendant's conduct as
criminal in nature. 8
7
Nevertheless, in a number of jurisdictions, legal impossibility is
still a potential defense. This is so for a number of reasons. First,
some courts explicitly allow the defense." Second, other jurisdic-
tions skirt the issue by finding that a particular case involves
only factual impossibility, thus keeping alive the possibility that
legal impossibility is a viable defense. 9
Third, even in jurisdictions that have seemingly banned the
impossibility defense by statute, courts have reasoned that legal
impossibility is still a defense. For example, an Ohio attempt
statute stated, "[i]t is no defense to a charge under this section
S.E.2d 433, 441 (N.C. 1982) ("We do not believe that either legal or factual impossibility
should be used as a shield. .. ."); State v. Ferreira, 463 A.2d 129, 132 (R.I. 1983) ("[A]ny
type of impossibility argument, legal or factual, is not a defense to a criminal-attempt
charge."); State v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356, 358-59 (Vt. 1991) (rejecting impossibility defense
and noting that the majority of jurisdictions have followed the modern trend of rejecting
such a defense).
86. United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States
v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing an earlier formulation of the
standard).
87. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus in Oviedo, the
court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that a defendant who sold pro-
caine, a lawful substance, to an undercover officer, intended to sell him heroin. Id. at 886.
The defendant's conviction for attempted sale of heroin was thus reversed. Id. The Fifth
Circuit's approach is also used in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v.
Everett, 692 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Innella, 690 F.2d 834, 835
(11th Cir. 1982).
88. E.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing legal
impossibility as a defense, but finding that Congress did not intend to allow its use in at-
tempt crimes created by the Economic Espionage Act of 1996); United States v. Hamrick,
43 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 1995) (While the court found that the case before it involved fac-
tual impossibility, it stated that "[t]he defense of legal impossibility is available where the
defendant's acts, even if fully carried out as intended, would not constitute a crime.").
89. See, e.g., Chen v. State, 42 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ("We find it
unnecessary to dispose of the legal impossibility doctrine at this time .... [Aippellant's
case ... presents [a question of] factual impossibility.").
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that, in retrospect, commission of the offense which was the ob-
ject of the attempt was . . . impossible under the . . . circum-
stances .. .. ""9 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in
State v. Collins9 ruled that the statutory language covered only
factually impossible attempts. The court reasoned that the lan-
guage "commission of the offense" presupposes that the offense
was legally possible to commit, and therefore the statute covered
only factual impossibilities.92 In response to the Collins ruling,
the Ohio legislature revised the statute, which now specifically
bans both factual and legal impossibility defenses.93
The final reason for legal impossibility's apparent endurance is
the inexact use of the term by the courts. When courts hold that
"legal impossibility" is a defense to attempt, it is not always clear
to which category of impossibility they are referring: pure, hybrid,
or logical impossibility.94 A solution to this particular problem is
straightforward. Courts and commentators should specify the
type of impossibility to which they are referring. If we look at ex-
isting case law under this solution, we can see that some diffi-
culty is immediately eradicated because the cases fall into the
two, non-controversial subcategories of legal impossibility-pure
and logical impossibility.95 What remains are the difficult "hybrid
legal impossibility" cases that will be discussed in the particular
context of the Internet sex cases.
90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(B) (Anderson 1995).
91. 561 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
92. Id. at 956.
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(B) (Anderson 2002).
94. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text for definitions. See, e.g., United
States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing impossibility defense with-
out categorizing).
95. See, e.g., Stennet v. State, 564 So. 2d 95, 95-96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding the
crime of attempted manslaughter is impossible because the crime of attempt requires in-
tent while the crime of manslaughter only requires recklessness and the two terms are
inconsistent); People v. Meyer, 952 P.2d 774, 776 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that be-
cause the crime of attempt requires a culpable mental state while the crime of felony mur-
der does not, "the offense of attempted felony murder constitutes a logical impossibility");
State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206 (Me. 1979) (holding the crime of attempted manslaughter is
a logical impossibility); State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730, 733-35 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that it is logically impossible for a defendant to be convicted of attempting to commit man-
slaughter involving culpable negligence); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 1992)
(holding that the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah
because attempt requires intent while the intent required for depraved indifference falls
short of intent).
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III. THE INTERNET CASES
The Internet sting cases have generated an impressive number
of arrests and convictions.96 Defendants appealing their convic-
tions raise defenses ranging from entrapment 97 to constitutional
96. See supra note 1.
97. A full exploration of the issues surrounding the entrapment defense is outside the
scope of this article because it does not specially concern mens rea issues surrounding at-
tempt liability. A defendant who claims to have been entrapped by the government may
have a valid excuse for his conduct, but the defense does not go directly to negating his
intent. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 5.2(f), at 463. Nevertheless, a brief discus-
sion of the defense is necessary because of its potential use in Internet sting operations.
Currently there are two major approaches to the entrapment defense. The majority or
subjective approach is set forth in the majority opinions of Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958) and Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The modern objective
approach is set forth in the concurring opinions of Sherman and Sorrells. These two ap-
proaches reflect distinct differences in their tests and rationales.
The subjective approach utilizes a two-step test: the first inquiry is whether the defen-
dant was induced by a government agent, and the second inquiry is whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the type of offense charged. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73;
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. The main focus of this approach is on the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the crime. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. Not
only must the defendant be predisposed to commit the crime, it must also be established
that the defendant's predisposition existed prior to his contact with the first contact by the
government agent. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (noting predis-
position must be present before encountering the officer). The underlying rationale for the
subjective approach is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Sorrells that the legis-
lature did not intend to include within the offense persons who were induced by the gov-
ernment into committing the offense. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. The subjective approach is
employed by all of the Federal Circuits and most states. See generally Christopher D.
Moore, The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1151 (1995).
In contrast, the objective approach was set forth in the concurring opinions of both
Sherman and Sorrells, and is promulgated by the Model Penal Code. See Sherman, 356
U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Permissible police activity does not vary accord-
ing to the particular defendant concerned."); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., concur-
ring); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). In contrast
to the subjective approach, this approach focuses not on the predisposition of the defen-
dant but on the conduct of the agents of the government. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 3
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Entrapment will be established where a gov-
ernment agent induces a defendant by "employing methods of persuasion or inducement
that create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b). In determining
whether the government agent's conduct rises to such a level, the particular circumstances
of the case must be examined. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("What police conduct is to be condemned, because likely to induce those not otherwise
ready and willing to commit crime, must be picked out from case to case as new situations
arise involving different crimes and new methods of detection."). Conduct such as badger-
ing, cajoling, offers of personal gain, persistent, repeated offers, appealing to friendship or
eliciting sympathy from the suspect, all may provide evidence of over-zealousness on the
part of the government agent. People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979).
Proponents of this approach hold that it is the duty of the courts to protect innocent citi-
zens by controlling overreaching by law enforcement officials. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
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violations.9" This article focuses solely on the defenses that chal-
lenge convictions on the basis that the requisites of attempt li-
ability have not been established. For example, defendants often
claim legal impossibility as a defense to attempt charges that
stem from Internet sting operations.99
Some jurisdictions have used the Internet cases to specifically
reject the distinction between factual and legal impossibility. For
example, in People v. Thousand,'° the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan granted leave to consider whether the doctrine of "impossibil-
ity" provides a defense to a charge of attempted distribution of
obscene material to a minor.1"' The defendant was a twenty-
three-year-old male who entered a chat room and began a series
of conversations with a sheriffs deputy acting undercover, who
2.13 cmt. 3. The objective approach has been adopted by several states either by statute or
judicial creation. Id; see, e.g., People v. Watson, 990 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Cal. 2000); State v.
Valdez-Molina, 897 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho 1995); State v. Babers, 514 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Iowa
1994); People v. Johnson, 647 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Mich. 2002); State v. Ogden, 640 A.2d 6,
12 (Vt. 1993).
For a discussion of the issues surrounding entrapment and Internet sting operations,
see Sheetz, supra note 1; Jennifer Gregg, Caught in the Web: Entrapment Law in Cyber-
space, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 157 (1996); Jarrod S. Hanson, Comment, Entrap-
ment in Cyberspace: A Renewed Call for Reasonable Suspicion, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535.
The defense has had mixed results to date. See, e.g., United States v. Poehlman, 217
F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); People v.
Reed, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569 (Kan. 2001).
98. Defendants in Internet sting operations who have transmitted child pornography
or indecent materials to undercover agents and who have been charged with violating
various federal or state statutes have claimed their First Amendment rights have been
violated. See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v.
Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2000); State v. Robins, 646 N.W.2d 287, 288 (Wis. 2002).
However, courts have generally ruled that statutes designed to prohibit unlawful conduct
against minors are not constitutionally infirm regulations of speech. See, e.g., Robins, 646
N.W.2d at 288. In contrast, courts have struck down statutes that regulate the possession
or distribution of child pornography on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241, 256-58 (2002) (holding that certain portions of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act that attempted to outlaw virtual pornography were un-
constitutional).
99. See, e.g., Hatch v. People, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v.
Reed, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Hudson v. State, 745 So. 2d 997, 1000
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 571 (Kan. 2001); People v. Meyers,
649 N.W.2d 123, 131 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Bloom v. Commonwealth, 542 S.E.2d 18, 21
(Va. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Koenck, 626 N.W.2d 359, 363-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001); see
also State v. Carlisle, 8 P.3d 391, 395 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Van Bell v. State, 775 P.2d
1273, 1274 (Nev. 1989) (involving a non-Internet undercover operation where there was a
promise of a fictitious child); cf. Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (conceiving attempted child solicitation).
100. 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001).
101. Id. at 695.
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described himself as a fourteen-year-old female named "Bekka."10 2
For a week the defendant engaged "Bekka" in a series of sexually
explicit conversations and sent "her" a photograph of male genita-
lia over the Internet."3 The evidence demonstrated that the de-
fendant believed "Bekka" was fourteen years old.104 After the de-
fendant and "Bekka" made arrangements to meet, defendant was
arrested and charged with, among other offenses, attempted dis-
tribution of obscene material to a minor.105 Following his arrest,
the defendant moved to quash the information on the grounds
that the evidence was legally insufficient because of the absence
of a child victim.
10 6
The trial court and court of appeals agreed, ruling that it was
legally impossible to attempt the crimes with which the defen-
dant was charged.0 7 Relying heavily on Professor Dressler's ex-
planation of the subtle distinction between factual and legal im-
possibility, ' ° the court of appeals reasoned that it was legally
impossible for a defendant to attempt to disseminate obscene ma-
terials to a minor, where the recipient of the materials was in fact
an adult.0 9 The crux of the court's analysis was that the defen-
dant's mistake went to the legal status of a material element of
the offense-the attempted distribution of obscene material to a
"minor."10 Since it is not a crime to send the material to an adult,
it was impossible to commit the crime."' Accordingly, it was also
impossible to attempt to commit the crime because dissemination
to an adult could never be a crime." 2
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed." 3 Rather than en-
gage in the same hair-splitting analysis undertaken by the court
of appeals on whether the case was one of factual or legal impos-
sibility, the supreme court ruled that neither is a defense in
102. Id. at 696.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 696-97.
106. Id. at 697.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
109. People v. Thousand, 614 N.W.2d 674, 679-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. People v. Thousand, 631 N.W.2d 694, 695 (Mich. 2001).
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Michigan.1 14 The court noted that nothing in Michigan common
law recognizes legal impossibility as a defense.11 Furthermore,
the court examined the language and legislative history of the
Michigan attempt statute and found no indication of legislative
intent to create such a defense. 16
In a similar fashion, in United States v. Farner,17 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected a
claim of legal impossibility after a defendant was charged with
attempting to "entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual activ-
ity," when in fact, the defendant was involved in internet conver-
sations with an adult undercover FBI agent.118 The court noted
that the Fifth Circuit "has properly eschewed the semantical
thicket of the impossibility defense in criminal attempt cases...
",119 Instead, utilizing a test that measures whether the defendant
intended to commit the underlying offense and whether his acts,
viewed objectively, manifested this intent, 2 ° the Farner court
ruled that the defendant's guilt was firmly established by the evi-
dence which included his explicit e-mail communications, his acts
of sending pornographic images over the Internet, his arrange-
ment to meet the supposed minor, and his driving to the meeting
spot with condoms and lubricant in his possession. 21
In contrast, a few courts have agreed that attempt liability in
Internet sting cases is legally impossible. 22 Other courts, while
acknowledging the viability of legal impossibility as a defense re-
ject its applicability in the Internet cases. Thus, in Chen v.
114. Id. at 701.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 702.
117. 251 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2001).
118. Id. at 511; accord United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1228-30 (11th Cir. 2002);
State v. Laughner, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
119. Farner, 251 F.3d at 513.
120. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
121. Farner, 251 F.3d at 511, 514; accord Root, 296 F.3d at 1228-30 (noting that the
defendant's objective acts of initiating explicit communications in which he asked the "mi-
nor" to engage in intercourse with him, driving five hours to meet the victim, and stating
that he was there to engage in sex with a 13-year-old were sufficient to establish attempt
liability).
122. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 810 A.2d 964, 985 (Md. 2002) (ruling that the trial court's
dismissal of attempt charges on grounds of legal impossibility barred reindictment as vio-
lative of double jeopardy principles); People v. Thousand, 614 N.W.2d 674, 679-80 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001).
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State,23 the defendant posted advertisements on the Internet for
a nude dancer.'24 An adult undercover agent calling himself
"Julie" responded that "she" was interested in the job but that she
was thirteen years old.'25 After a series of sexually explicit e-
mails,126 the defendant arranged to meet "Julie" at a local mo-
tel. 127 When he was arrested, the defendant admitted that he was
planning to show a girl how to have sex.1 28 Convicted of attempted
molestation of a child, the defendant claimed it was legally im-
possible to commit the crime when he in fact had been e-mailing
an adult.129 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that the
case was not one of factual impossibility and rejected the defen-
dant's appeal.1 3' Nevertheless, the court stated that, "[wie find it
unnecessary to dispose of the legal impossibility doctrine at this
time."' 3 '
Aside from claiming impossibility as a defense, the defendants
in a number of Internet cases claim lack of sufficient evidence
that the actus reus requirements of attempt liability have been
met. 32 For example, in State v. Robins,33 the defendant engaged
123. 42 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
124. Id. at 927.
125. Id.
126. Appellant had placed the following ad on an on-line bulletin board: "'A nude
dancer needed for discreet pleasure. I am generous and rich. You must be very attractive
and young.'" Id. An undercover law enforcement officer e-mailed appellant back repre-
senting himself as J. Cirello and asked appellant "'how young of a nude dancer [he was]
looking for.'" The appellant responded, "I will say between 20 and 30 or as long as you
have a young looking face and tender body.'" Id. The officer responded that no one in that
age range was available and signed the e-mail "J. Cirello." Id.
Again the appellant e-mailed asking, "What age are you in?'" To this, the officer wrote,
"'If you don't care about age I am 13, looking for independence. What are you looking for?'"
Appellant responded that he was "looking for a girl who 'dares to be nude and watched by
me while I am masturbating.'" Appellant then asked if they could "'get together' and re-
quested her name and location." The officer e-mailed in response, stating "'My name is Ju-
lie.'" Additionally, he wrote that "'Julie' had never seen a man masturbate and did not
want 'her' parents to find out." Id.
127. Id. at 928.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 930-31.
131. Id. at 929; see also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 542 S.E.2d 18, 21 (Va. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that "[1legal impossibility is a defense; factual impossibility is not."); United
States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "Crow's arguments... de-
rive from not legal, but factual impossibility."). Since the Crow opinion, the Fifth Circuit
has stated that it does not differentiate between factual and legal impossibility. United
States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001).
132. See, e.g., State v. Carlisle, 8 P.3d 391, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Reed, 61
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in a number of on-line conversations with an undercover agent
posing as a thirteen-year-old boy.' During their conversations,
the defendant "was persistent in setting up a meeting" between
them.135 Eventually the two agreed to meet at a local restaurant,
informed each other what they would be wearing so that they
could recognize each other, and planned for the defendant to find
a motel for them after the initial restaurant meeting. 136 The de-
fendant was arrested as he was walking into the restaurant
137
and charged with attempted child enticement.3 3 Following a pre-
liminary hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
on a variety of grounds, one of which was that the evidence estab-
lished only mere preparation to commit an offense, and thus was
legally insufficient to support an attempt charge. 39 In rejecting
this claim, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that the evi-
dence was more than sufficient to support the attempt charge.
40
In particular, the court delineated that not only was there evi-
dence of the on-line communications, but also evidence that the
defendant arranged a meeting place, traveled to, and arrived at
the meeting place before being arrested.'
4
'
Comingling the impossibility and actus reus defenses, the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals in State v. Kemp'42 rejected attempt liabil-
ity in Internet sting operations on the grounds that the defendant
could never take substantial steps toward completing the crime
when the victim was a fictitious child.143 The court of appeals up-
held a trial court ruling that attempted child molestation requires
that the victim be an actual, not fictitious, child."M In Kemp, the
Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Dennard v. State, 534 S.E.2d 182, 186 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000); People v. Scott, 740 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Patterson,
734 N.E.2d 462, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); cf. Van Bell v. State, 775 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Nev.
1989) (involving the defendant's attempt to sexually assault a fictitious child during a non-
Internet undercover operation).
133. 646 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Wis. 2002).
134. Id. at 289.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 290.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 287.
139. Id. at 295.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 753 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id.
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defendant, whose Internet screen name was "Ineedyoungtightl,"
had sexually explicit communications with an undercover agent
posing as a child.145 The defendant agreed to meet with the "child"
near a motel and had condoms with him when arrested.146 Never-
theless, since the defendant was engaged in Internet conversa-
tions with an adult, the court found that the defendant could not
be guilty of attempted child molestation because he never took a
substantial step toward the completion of the offense. 47 While the
Indiana Court of Appeals did not expressly use the term "legal
impossibility" in affirming the dismissal of the charges against
the defendant, its reasoning implicitly adopted the doctrine.' 48
Some defendants claim that they never intended to communi-
cate with a child and that their conversations merely reflect their
145. Id. at 48.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 51.
148. The Kemp court held that the defendant's acts did not rise to the level of attempt-
ing to molest or solicit a child. Id. at 52. With regard to the molestation charge, the court
held that the defendant's acts only rose to the level of preparation because there was never
an actual child to molest. Id. at 51. In considering the solicitation charge, the court held
that there was nothing in the defendant's behavior to "demonstrate that the offense was to
be 'immediately committed,'" as required by the statute. Id. at 52. Although the court did
not explicitly state that the dismissal of the charge was due to the legal impossibility of
having no actual child to solicit or molest, this notion was implied by the court's charge to
the legislature. The court suggested that the legislature should expand the definition of
child solicitation to permit a defendant to be found guilty of the offense if he or she solicits
a child or another person "'believed by the defendant to be a child.'" Id. at 52 (quoting FLA.
STAT. ch. 847.0135(3) (Supp. 1996).
The Kemp court's rationale relied heavily on State v. Duke, 709 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998). In Duke, the defendant communicated in sexually explicit terms over the
Internet with someone whom he believed to be a child, but who in fact was an undercover
detective. Id. at 581. Defendant was arrested at the scene of where he had agreed to meet
the "child." Id. The Florida District Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction of
attempted sexual battery on a child on the basis that the defendant's conduct did not pro-
gress beyond mere preparation. Id. at 582. The concurring opinion made clear that the
lack of a victim was the basis of the reversal, in stating that, "[iut is difficult to see how ...
an attempt to commit sexual battery could occur when the victim was not even present."
Id. (Harris, J., concurring). The Florida legislature subsequently revised the statute under
which Duke was charged. The revised statute criminalizes the use of a computer to solicit
sex from a minor or from a person the defendant believes to be a minor. FLA. STAT. ch.
847.0135(3) (2000). However, in People v. Reed, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996),
the California Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's assertion that the lack of a real
victim precluded liability for attempted molestation of a child. Id. at 661. The defendant
asserted that his Internet communications and meeting with an undercover detective, who
posed as the mother of the would-be victim, were merely preparatory steps. Id. at 662.
Significantly, the court also rejected the defendant's separate claim of impossibility. Id. at
661.
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fantasies. 149 These defendants assert that role-playing is rampant
on the Internet, and that they never believed that they were
communicating with a child; rather they thought it was another
adult pretending to be a child (which of course, ironically, it was).
For example, in People v. Scott,' an undercover detective, who
had responded to the defendant's instant message, contacted the
defendant. The detective claimed he was twelve years old; he and
the defendant engaged in a series of sexually explicit communica-
tions, and the defendant sent pornographic pictures over the
Internet to the detective. A meeting was arranged, and the defen-
dant was arrested as he approached the agreed-upon location. On
appeal, the defendant raised a fantasy defense by claiming that
the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to commit
an offense against a child and took substantial steps to that end.
In rejecting this claim, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
finding that the evidence "is more than just a fantasy transmis-
sion over the electronic media of thoughts and desires. A child
was solicited in the defendant's mind, a date was made, and he
drove to meet the person ... ""'
A less typical defense against attempt charges was presented
in State v. Jones.'52 There the trial court convicted the defendant
of attempted indecent liberties with a child after he was caught in
an Internet sting operation.'53 On appeal, the defendant claimed
149. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the
defendant's claim that e-mailing the three minors, urging them to meet with him, and de-
scribing how he wanted to perform oral sex on them "was all just a game"); United States
v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 237-38, 238 n.4 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant's claim that he
was merely playing a fantasy game and did not know that the victim was a child, the court
held there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that his claims were not credible);
People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2650, *28-37 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 27, 2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim that when he was on-line he was involved
in fantasy play and therefore had no knowledge of the victim's ages, the court held that a
reasonable jury weighing the evidence could conclude that the defendant knew he was
dealing with minors, particularly in light of the defendant's online conversations with the
girls combined with his plans to meet them); People v. Scott, 740 N.E.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (rejecting the defendant's fantasy claim and finding "no basis to con-
clude that a rational trier of fact could not have found that the defendant had committed a
substantial step and had possessed the requisite intent"). See generally Sheetz, supra note
1, at 424-28; Donald S. Yamagami, Comment, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can
Intent Be Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 547 (2001) (discussing United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997),
where the fantasy defense led to an acquittal).
150. 740 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
151. Id. at 1208.
152. 21 P.3d 569 (Kan. 2001).
153. Id. at 570.
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that he lacked the specific intent to commit the offense because
the age of the victim was not material to him."' In other words,
since he did not care whether the "person" with whom he commu-
nicated over the Internet was a child or not, he could not have at-
tempted the crime of indecent liberties with a child.155 The court
rejected this defense on the ground that since the age of the child
is a strict liability element of the offense-in-chief, it is immaterial
to the intent needed for attempt.15 6 State v. Jones thus raises the
issue of whether one can attempt to commit a crime when one
does not have intent as to all of the elements of the offense.
57
These contemporary illustrations of defense efforts to overturn
convictions call for a new examination of the rationale and re-
quirements of attempt liability. The cases involving the impossi-
bility defense raise questions about its rationale, the reasons for
its apparent viability, and renewed reasons for its abolition. 5 8 In
addition, the Internet cases raise new questions about the appro-
priate mens rea for attempt liability.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE STING
To assess attempt liability in the Internet sting cases, we must
first examine the elements of the underlying offenses. The vari-
ous offenses run the gamut from child molestation, indecent liber-
ties with a child, unlawful conduct with a child, to distribution of
obscene material to a minor. 59 The common thread to each of-
fense is the element of a "child" or a "minor." This requirement is
an attendant circumstance, i.e., something that exists independ-
154. Id. at 571.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2000) (criminalizing the commission of a sexual act
or the attempt to commit such an act with an individual between the ages of twelve and
sixteen years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (prohibiting the se-
duction of a minor); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003)
(prohibiting the predatory sexual assault of a child); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503(a) (1995 &
Supp. 2002) (prohibiting indecent liberties with a child); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.142 (West 1991) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material to a minor); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.25 (Vernon 2003) (prohibiting sexual conduct with a child); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-370(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003) (criminalizing the invitation of a child to any place for
sexual purposes).
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ently of the defendant's conduct.16 ° If the defendant believes he is
dealing with a child, the issue that arises is one of impossibil-
ity. 6' If the defendant claims that he did not think he was deal-
ing with a child, or did not care whether he was dealing with a
child, the issue is whether he has the requisite mens rea for at-
tempt culpability.
16 2
A. The Mistaken Internet User
A defendant who believes he is communicating with a child
over the Internet, not an adult undercover agent, provides the
perfect situation for examining the apparent resilience of the le-
gal impossibility doctrine. From various decisions described
above, it is evident that not only are defendants raising the im-
possibility defense, but some courts view the Internet cases as in-
stances where it is legally impossible to convict a defendant of at-
tempting a crime against a fictitious child.163 Moreover, legal
scholars have shown such interest in the impossibility doctrine,
that they appear to have forestalled its demise.'
In fact, the Internet cases represent the best rationale for re-
jecting legal impossibility as a defense to attempt liability. An ac-
tor who believes he is dealing with a minor in Internet communi-
cations should not be shielded from attempt liability merely
because the requirement of a "minor" is missing. The classifica-
tion of the "minor" requirement-as a legal element or a factual
circumstance-should be irrelevant to a determination of the ac-
tor's attempt liability. Instead, the law should focus on what the
defendant intended to do, rather than what it turns out he did.
160. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
162. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (de-
fining the minimum requirements of culpability); Id. § 1.13(12) (stating that the term "in-
tentionally" is synonymous with "purposely"); Id. § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) (stating that "[a] person
acts purposely with respect to [an attendant circumstance] when . . . he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist").
163. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
164. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.3(a), at 552 (stating that 'scholars in the field of sub-
stantive criminal law appear to be more fascinated with the subject of impossibility in at-
tempts than with any other subject").
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This is particularly true because of the well-noted difficulty in
distinguishing between a legal and factual element. 65
Aside from the practical difficulty in finding a workable tool for
distinguishing between factual and legal elements, a more fun-
damental reason exists for eliminating the defense of legal impos-
sibility, which is epitomized by the Internet cases. The longevity
of the legal impossibility doctrine rests in part on the fears of ob-
jectivists that without it, actors will be punished for outwardly
innocent acts.166 Objectivists reason that unless the danger is
manifest, i.e., apparent to an objective viewer, a danger exists
that the actor will be punished on the basis of bad thoughts, im-
properly punished without adequate proof of harm, or convicted
based on improper evidentiary and prosecutorial tactics.167
Clearly, courts and scholars need to address the line between pro-
tected speech and illegal conduct, which might be blurred by the
ease of access to the Internet. Nevertheless, the ease with which
the Internet unmasks evil intentions points to the need for police
intervention in the form of sting operations before harm to minors
occurs.
The very nature of the Internet cases obviates concerns about
improper punishment. A record of a defendant's actions and in-
tent is contained in the Internet communications. 6 ' Thus, con-
cern about improper prosecutorial tactics such as coerced confes-
sions is unfounded. 169 Likewise, while meeting an adult in a motel
may seem like objectively innocent conduct, the previous Internet
communications make clear the intent behind the actor's con-
duct. 170 The actor's intent is patent from the Internet communica-
165. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
166. Enker, supra note 16, at 689.
167. See Enker, supra note 16; Jensen, supra note 14, at 367-70; see also supra notes
14-19 and accompanying text.
168. An actor's predisposition towards unlawfully dealing with children is an entrap-
ment issue. See supra note 97. Whether the communications reflect an intent to unlaw-
fully deal with a child, as opposed to a fantasy game, is a separate issue. See infra notes
186-88.
169. See supra note 74.
170. Internet communications fit remarkably well with Professor Weigend's proposal
that impossibility cases be judged by statements an actor makes which accompany his ac-
tions. If the statements arouse alarm or apprehension to the average observer, attempt
liability is appropriate. See Weigend, supra note 62, at 267-68. He uses the infamous ex-
ample of a man who shoots at a tree stump believing it to be his enemy and is subse-
quently cleared of attempted murder on the grounds of legal impossibility. Weigend, supra
note 62, at 270-71. If there was no evidence other than the act of shooting, no apprehen-
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tions. Thus, allowing an actor to escape liability based on legal
impossibility has no foundation because its main rationale is
gone. 1
71
Imposing liability under a finding of factual impossibility,
while allowing the legal impossibility doctrine to survive, as did
the Texas court in Chen v. State172 is an imperfect solution. The
danger that a court will find that an Internet sex case is one of
hybrid legal impossibility, as did the lower court in People v.
Thousand,"' would still exist.174 Moreover, skirting the issue al-
lows for the continuation of the imprecise terminology that has
plagued the legal impossibility doctrine. At the very least, courts
finding that Internet cases involve factual impossibility should
use the cases as an opportunity to express the viability of the de-
fense of pure legal impossibility and to reject in precise language
the doctrine of hybrid legal impossibility.
Just as the impossibility doctrine should not shield the Inter-
net user from liability when he mistakenly believes he is dealing
with a minor, courts should reject defense claims that a defen-
dant has not met the actus reus requirement of attempt simply
because he was dealing with an undercover agent. The most trou-
bling cases are similar to those such as State v. Kemp, 7 5 where
the court rejected attempt liability in an Internet sex case based
on a finding that the defendant could not have taken substantial
steps toward completion of the crime when the victim was a ficti-
tious child.'76 In fact, it would be impossible to ever complete the
crime in these circumstances because no child was involved. This
sion would occur, and there would be no attempt liability. Id. at 270. However, if there is
evidence that, prior to the shooting, the actor told his companion that he was out to get his
enemy, the act of shooting would cause alarm; the actor should be found guilty of at-
tempted murder. Id. at 270-71. Using the alarm test in the context of attempted offenses
against a minor-Internet communications occurring before the actor sets out to meet his
victim-shows the actor's intention to meet the minor.
171. Defendants arrested through Internet sting operations have also raised the de-
fenses of entrapment and the new "fantasy" defense. See infra notes 97, 186-93 and ac-
companying text.
172. 42 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
173. 614 N.W.2d 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd in part, 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001).
174. Supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
175. 753 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
176. Id. at 51; see also State v. Duke, 709 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(barring liability based on the same reasoning); supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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line of reasoning is a death knell to the use of sting operations in
Internet sex crimes.
The Kemp decision is all the more alarming because it comes
from a jurisdiction that has statutorily barred use of the impossi-
bility defense. 177 Thus the case contravenes specific legislative in-
tent that defendants not escape attempt liability when their in-
ability to complete an offense is due to an unknown circumstance.
The shift in judicial focus from the actor's mens rea, which is the
root of impossibility cases, to the actor's actus reus raises new
concerns and calls for different scrutiny. In order to understand
the significance of the Kemp decision, we need to put it in the con-
text of history and development of actus reus concerns.
171
Significantly, disenchantment with the proximity test for as-
sessing attempt liability was stirred by the ruling in People v.
Rizzo," 9 a 1927 case with some parallels to Kemp. In Rizzo, four
defendants were convicted of attempted robbery after they set out
to rob a payroll clerk, whom they never found.180 In reversing the
attempt conviction, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that,
under the prevailing proximity test and without the presence of
the victim, the defendants were not dangerously near commission
of the robbery; therefore, they could not be guilty of attempt. 1
Criticism of the Rizzo result was one of the factors behind the
Model Penal Code's adoption of the substantial step test. 182
By analogy, and taken to its logical extreme, if the victim is fic-
titious, as in the Internet sting operations, a defendant could
never be dangerously near completion of the intended sex offense.
Defendants who contend that Internet sting cases raise actus
reus issues solely because they employ fictitious children are sim-
ply incorrect. If this were true, every impossibility case could be
177. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(b) (Michie 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002); see also Laugh-
ner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003).
Florida also has barred the impossibility defense. See State v. Rios, 409 So. 2d 241, 243-44
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). This makes the Duke rationale equally suspect. See supra note
148.
178. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
179. 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927).
180. Id. at 888.
181. Id. at 889-90.
182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(6)(b)(i), (iv) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
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examined through the actus reus lens.l"3 For example, one could
assert that in picking an empty pocket, a defendant never came
close to completing the intended offense; therefore, he is not
guilty of attempted larceny.
Actus reus issues should be reserved for situations where de-
fendants claim police intervention occurred before an attempt
was established.8 4 For example, if an arrest were made simply on
the basis of the Internet communications and before defendant
set out to meet the victim, one could argue that the defendant did
not cross the preparation/attempt line."8 ' But, the courts should
not support a claim that a defendant could not cross the line sim-
ply because of the use of a fictitious victim.
B. The Oblivious Internet User
Defendants caught in Internet stings are increasingly claiming
that they were just engaging in role-playing or fantasy games and
had no intent to commit the underlying offense.8 6 The fantasy de-
fense in essence asks that an objectivist view of the evidence be
ignored, and instead that a defendant's subjective belief that he
was role-playing be accepted. This is an interesting twist on the
paradigm that limits attempt liability under an objectivist ap-
proach and expands it under a subjectivist view.8 7 The fantasy
defense calls for the exact opposite result. As such, the fantasy
cases do not represent an extension of the accepted rules of at-
tempt liability, but, rather, question the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to establish that the defendant believed that he was com-
municating with a child and not with another adult in some
fantasy game.'
183. Some commentators suggest that impossibility cases should be viewed as raising
actus reus issues. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 30; Ryu, supra note 14, at 1189; J.C.
Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 422, 423 (1957). As dis-
cussed above, if this were the case even instances of factual impossibility would be a de-
fense.
184. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 740 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("What we are
necessarily concerned with is whether the communications, coupled with the defendant's
act of driving to the agreed-upon location, constitute a substantial step. . . . '[I]t is more
than just a fantasy transmission over the electronic media of thoughts and desires.'").
186. See supra notes 149-51.
187. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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To sufficiently establish a defendant's intent, law enforcement
must conduct sting operations in a manner that makes it abun-
dantly clear that the defendant is aware that he is communicat-
ing with an apparent "child."" 9 Typically, the undercover agents
repeatedly state in their Internet conversation that they are un-
derage.1"' The time frame, quantity, and content of the communi-
cations are crucial in assessing the defendant's intent.'9 '
189. See generally Cobb, supra note 1, at 813-16; Sheetz, supra note 1, at 425-28.
These cases demonstrate how trained law enforcement officers communicate that they are
'minors." It is not only stating their supposed age, but also communicating in an age-
appropriate fashion. See, for example, People v. Patterson, 734 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000), where the following dialogue was reported between the defendant, whose screen
name was "Boysneeded," and the undercover officer, "Yacoo":
Boysneeded: having problems
Yacoo: yep
Boysneeded: lol
Yacoo: must be the rain
Boysneeded: yes not a good day but good for sex.. [sic]
Boysneeded: would you like a blow job today?
Yacoo: ya it would be its cold and raining out
Yacoo: id love one
Boysneeded: so want me to cum to you
Boysneeded: are you home a lone
Yacoo: i do but im scard no my moms home
Boysneeded: oh
Yacoo: shes up stairs
Boysneeded: well if she is home i couldnt give a blow job then
Yacoo: if we ment [sic] some where
Boysneeded: where?
Boysneeded: then how would we do anything?
Yacoo: we could drive around and get to know each other then see
Boysneeded: I see so do youu [sic] want to do that ?
Boysneeded: so do you play around with any of you [sic] friends?
Yacoo: maybe we could meet at gurnee mills, no i havnt [sic] found a friend to
do
that with
Boysneeded: when do you want to meet.. [sic]
Yacoo: whats good for you
Boysneeded: don't know need to get a shower and then a 30 min drive how
will i find you?
Yacoo: you know where mcdonalds is
Boysneeded: don't know the area that is good a littel [sic] woried about this
here
about men going to meet young men and they get arrested
Id.
190. See supra note 189.
191. See Martin G. Weinberg et al., Internet Sexual Entrapment: The Uses & Misuses of
18 U.S.C. 2423(b), CHAMPION, Aug. 2002, at 12; Martin G. Weinberg et al., Internet Sexual
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Additionally, a defendant's belief that he is dealing with a
child, and not in some role-playing fantasy with an adult, is often
corroborated by evidence gathered when the defendant is ar-
rested. For example, in one case, when a defendant was arrested
in the parking lot of a motel where he was to rendezvous with the
undercover "child," he had small sex toys and vibrators with
him. 92 To date, most courts have rejected the fantasy claim.193
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that a defendant will truly
believe that he is communicating with an adult because it is not
clear from the Internet communications that a minor, whether
fictitious or not, is involved. In that instance, where a defendant
believes he is communicating with an adult, he also intends to
communicate with an adult, and in fact, does communicate with
an adult, attempt liability is not possible.
C. The Indifferent Internet User
In contrast to the impossibility and fantasy defenses, the indif-
ferent Internet user, as exemplified in State v. Jones, 94 claims
that it was immaterial to him whether the person with whom he
was communicating was an adult or a child. This situation raises
another attempt issue to which "[clommentators have paid almost
no heed. ...""' The ramifications of the problem are best under-
stood in the context of some short scenarios:
SCENARIO A: The defendant does not know that he is dealing
with a child, but, in fact, the victim is a child. The underlying of-
fense provides that mistake as to age is not a defense. If he com-
pletes the offense, the defendant is guilty, notwithstanding a lack
Entrapment: The Uses & Misuses of 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 26.
192. People v. Reed, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the de-
fendant had mini-vibrators, dildos in different sizes, and lubricating jelly).
193. See cases cited supra note 149. Recently, a mistrial was declared in a trial of a
Navy physicist accused of using the Internet to solicit sex from a minor, because the jury
was deadlocked on whether the defendant intended to deal with a minor. The defendant
raised the fantasy defense, claiming that he believed he was role-playing with another
adult. Allan Lengel, Online Sex Sting Ends With Mistrial: Jury Deadlocks in Navy Physi-
cist's Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2002, at B1.
194. 21 P.3d 569 (Kan. 2001); see supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
195. Simons, supra note 63, at 478.
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of knowledge as to the age of the victim, as long as the victim is in
fact underage.196
SCENARIO B: Same as A above, except the defendant is arrested
before the underlying offense is completed. Under modem at-
tempt rules,197 the defendant is guilty of attempt, notwithstand-
ing his ignorance as to the age of the victim, as long as the victim
is in fact underage.
SCENARIO C: The defendant believes he is dealing with a child,
when in fact, he is communicating with an undercover agent.
Since the defendant believed the attendant circumstance existed
(even if it is a strict liability element), the impossibility of com-
pleting the underlying offense is not a defense. 198
SCENARIO D: The defendant is indifferent as to the age of the
victim, and age is a strict liability element, but the element is not
met because no child was ever used.
The Jones case represents Scenario D, with the court finding
that the defendant was guilty of attempted indecent liberties with
a minor.199 Yet, if the Jones defendant did not believe he was
dealing with a minor, and no minor was involved, two impedi-
ments to attempt liability exist: lack of appropriate mens rea and
impossibility. Nevertheless, the result in Jones may be correct.
Attempt law does not require that an actor have intent as to a
crime's attendant circumstances. It is usually sufficient that the
actor intends to engage in the prohibited conduct or cause the
prohibited result and have whatever mens rea is required by the
underlying offense for the attendant circumstances.200 This is so,
even if, as in many states, the attendant circumstance of "minor"
is a strict liability element.20 ' This rule is used typically in situa-
196. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
197. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 100-31 and accompanying text.
199. State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 570 (Kan. 2001).
200. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2.
201. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. By analogy, if the prosecution does not
have to establish that the defendant knew the victim's age, it should likewise not have to
establish that the defendant knew an actual child was involved.
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tions exemplified by Scenario B: the defendant lacks a belief as to
the attendant circumstances, which in fact exist.
0 2
In contrast, where the underlying offense is not completed be-
cause of a failure of the attendant circumstances, usually we have
an impossibility situation exemplified in Scenario C, which
should not bar attempt liability, since the defendant's belief was
that the attendant circumstance existed. 23 But in Jones, the de-
fendant did not intend to deal with a minor, and no minor was in-
volved; thus, two critical requirements of attempt liability were
missing.'24 The case is analogous to arguing that a defendant who
is indifferent as to whether a woman was consenting to inter-
course could be guilty of attempted rape even if she in fact was
consenting.2 5 Few would argue for conviction in the rape exam-
ple. The intuitive reaction in the rape situation is that there is no
victim, and therefore no crime, even if the defendant risked com-
206
mitting a crime.
Nevertheless, the Internet sting cases strike a different chord.
Is the person who risks dealing with a minor in need of punish-
ment? Many would say yes. The harm to children is so great that
exceptional rules are required. Some precedent exists for this ap-
proach. Most states provide that mistake as to the age of a minor
is not a defense to a sex crime, notwithstanding general rules
that allow mistake of fact as a defense.20 7 Defendants are thought
to assume the risk when they engage in conduct that may be
harmful to children. By that reasoning, a defendant who engages
in Internet communication with someone should be on notice to
make sure he is not dealing with a child.208 If he is indifferent, it
means he does not care whether he is dealing with a child, and
202. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
203. Id.
204. State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 571-72 (Kan. 2001).
205. See Larry Alexander and Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1159 n.35 (1997); R.A. Duff, Recklessness in Attempts
(Again), 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (1995); Simons, supra note 63.
206. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Some might disagree and say that
the person who risks forcing a woman to have intercourse is in need of punishment, par-
ticularly under a subjectivist model of punishment.
207. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
208. This is the flip side of the fantasy defense raised by some defendants. See supra
notes 149-51 and accompanying text. If, as some defendants assert, nothing is as it seems
on the Internet and role-playing and fantasizing is rampant, then defendants should also
be on notice that a minor could also be role-playing and fantasizing that he or she is an
adult.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
that should be culpable conduct. To use Professor Fletcher's ra-
tional motivation test, 09 we would ask, "what would the actor do
if he knew that X was not so?"21 In other words, what would the
defendant do if he knew that the person with whom he was com-
municating was a child? If the defendant would continue with the
communications, he manifests a danger to society that may merit
punishment. This indifference was the defendant's position in
Jones.21' The question then becomes whether attempt liability is
the appropriate punishment, or whether the defendant should be
guilty of some other offense. 2
209. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.3.4, at 161-66. In seeking a test to differentiate fac-
tual from legal impossibility, Fletcher proposed that one determine an actor's intent by
inquiring about his motivation. Id. at 161. Thus, according to Fletcher, "mistaken beliefs
are relevant to what the actor is trying to do if they affect his incentive in acting. They af-
fect his incentive if knowing of the mistake would give him a good reason for changing his
course of conduct." Id. Fletcher poses the following illustration that has strong bearing on
the Internet cases: "Suppose the accused engages in sexual intercourse with a girl he takes
to be under the age of consent; in fact, she is overage." Id. at 162. According to Fletcher,
the accused should not be guilty of attempted statutory rape because "[i]n the normal case
it would not be part of the actor's incentive that the girl be underage (again, one could
imagine a variation in which the youth of the girl did bear upon the actor's motivation)."
Id. (emphasis added). For criticism of Fletcher's test, see Jensen, supra note 14, at 364
n. 140.
210. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 3.3.4, at 163. The culpable mental state is recklessness.
Strict liability would be inappropriate; otherwise anyone engaging with an adult would be
guilty of attempt against a child.
211. State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 570 (Kan. 2001); see supra notes 152-57 and accom-
panying text.
212. For an example of one jurisdiction that prohibits risking injury to a minor, see
General Statutes of Connecticut (Annotated) section 53-21 (West Cum. Supp. 2003), which
provides:
Any person who (1) willfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under
the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of
such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the
morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair
the health or morals of any such child ... shall be guilty of a class C felony.
In State v. Cutro, 657 A.2d 239 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995), the defendant was masturbating in
his car in a public parking lot. Id. at 240. A seventeen-year-old observed him and stated
that she knew what he was doing. Id. Her fourteen-year-old sister saw him shaking, but
did not know what he was doing. Id. The defendant was charged with public indecency
and risking injury to a minor. Id. at 241. In upholding his convictions, the appellate court
noted that the victim did not have to be aware of the defendant's actions, and that guilt
could be established if the defendant's conduct demonstrated a reckless disregard of the
consequences. Id. at 242. See also Krukowski v. Swords, 15 F. Supp. 2d 188, 198 (D. Conn.
1998) (rejecting constitutional challenges to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (Supp. 1997)).
The difficulty with using this type of statute in the Internet sting cases is that, unlike
the cases cited above, no child is involved in communications. Since the endangerment
statute is inchoate in nature, applying it where no child is involved is problematic.
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For attempt liability to lie, special rules would be needed be-
cause the defendant does not have the mens rea traditionally re-
quired in impossibility situations. One approach would be to al-
low attempt liability if the defendant is grossly reckless as to the
existence of an attendant circumstance.213 This new attempt stat-
ute would have mens rea requirements similar to that of de-
praved indifference murder, where the defendant's indifference as
to the risk of death is deemed equivalent to intending the death
in terms of culpability and punishment.2 4
One scholar, who stated that attempt liability is theoretically
possible in situations analogous to those presented in Jones, sug-
gested an alternate approach. 2" He posited that if indifference is
tantamount to willful blindness, attempt liability may be appro-
priate.216 Thus, attempt liability could exist "when the defen-
dant's conduct would constitute a crime if the circumstances were
either as he believed them to be, or as he would have believed
them to be if he had not willfully blinded himself to the facts."21 7
Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of supporting the
result in Jones, formidable obstacles to doing so exist. The rules
of attempt liability would be stretched far beyond their tradi-
tional bounds that rest with intent. Under a subjectivist view of
criminality, a person who risks dealing with a minor has signaled
some danger to society. Yet, the desire to protect children must be
balanced against the risk of punishing innocent actors. While the
defendant may manifest a dangerous propensity when he risks
harming a child, he has neither harmed anyone with his Internet
behavior, nor intended to harm anyone. The dangerousness lies
closer to punishing someone solely for bad thoughts. Moreover,
213. A new rule would have to state:
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime, he purposely
engages in conduct that would constitute a crime if the attendant circum-
stances are as he believes them to be, or as he risks them to be, in a manner
that displays gross recklessness as to the existence of the attendant circum-
stances.
Further, gross recklessness as to attendant circumstances would have to be required even
if the completed crime had no mens rea as to its attendant circumstances.
214. See LAFAvE, supra note 5, § 7.4(a)-(b), at 666-70.
215. Simons, supra note 63. Other commentators appear to reject the possibility out of
hand. See DUFF, supra note 9.
216. Simons, supra note 63, at 481-82.
217. Id. at 482.
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we run a serious risk of violating a person's first amendment
rights.21 A person who is indifferent as to whether he is dealing
with a child, and who, in fact, is not dealing with a child is well
within his constitutional right of free speech when he communi-
cates over the Internet.
A better explanation for the result in Jones is simply that the
evidence did not support the defendant's claim that he was indif-
ferent as to whether he was communicating with a minor. Defen-
dants have had little success in claims that they were merely
role-playing or fantasizing about dealing with a child.219 Simi-
larly, juries may very well reject a claim of indifference. Thus,
rather than changing the rules of attempt liability, the prosecu-
tors would still need to prove that defendants believed they were
dealing with a minor. Preserving the intent element avoids the
potential risk of punishing an actor merely for bad thoughts.
The doctrine of attempt liability has progressed from an objec-
tivist view that manifested an historical hesitancy to punish
those who try, but fail to commit an offense, to a more contempo-
rary subjectivist stance that measures culpability by an actor's
dangerousness to society as shown by his intentions. The Internet
sting cases allow for a review of attempt doctrine in the most con-
temporary of settings. These cases provide new support for the re-
jection of the concept of legal impossibility as a defense to attempt
liability. They also reaffirm the main principle of attempt liability
as resting with intent. Such reaffirmation of the boundaries of the
attempt doctrine will ensure that defendants are not improperly
punished when they do not intend to communicate with a child,
and in fact do not communicate with a child. Likewise, defen-
dants who do believe that they are communicating with a child
will be punished, notwithstanding the impossibility of their at-
tempts.
V. CONCLUSION
The reach of the Internet has distinct influences on the devel-
opment of criminal attempt law. First, as seen above, it provides
218. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999); see generally Yama-
gami, supra note 149.
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contemporaneous and specific evidence of an actor's intent
through his own statements captured during his communications
in cyberspace.22 ° Such independent evidence of intent calls for a
crucial shift in attempt law. In the past, much of the rationale
behind limiting attempt liability hinged on the suspect nature of
the evidence of a defendant's intent, which until now has been es-
tablished by inference or by evidence that was subject to attack.
With that rationale now fatally weakened, attempt liability
should not be limited by the defense of legal impossibility.
Second, the ability to perpetrate crimes against children by use
of the Internet is unprecedented. Even at this nascent stage in
the development of the Internet, the risks it poses are so great
and so potentially devastating that we must emphasize special
protections against harm to children. Just as pedophiles have
vastly increased access to children through the Internet, law en-
forcement must have access to pedophiles by means of sting op-
erations. Both of these influences call for a final renunciation of
the impossibility defense. Nevertheless, the courts must protect
innocent Internet conduct, and, therefore, attempt liability must
be linked to intent to deal with a minor.
220. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(c) at 319-20 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); Enker, supra note 16.
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